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How Xabi Alonso’s Tactic BROKE Football!
Xabi Alonso went from pulling Bayer Leverkusen out of relegation to win the Bundesliga title in only 18 months, breaking German football. This club never won a league title since 100 years. From being a tiki taka team in first half to a counter attacking side in second half, based on diferent teams, Alonso keep changing his tactics. It only only confuses others teams but also make it almost impossible to break throught. They became the first team to win the league without loosing a single match. Since taking charge, Xabi has consistently used a 3 2 4 1 formation on paper. But instead of being ridig it keeps on changing during the match. It makes them unpredictable to play against. During build up they often play in a 4 2 4 asymetric shape with the right back staying upfront as a right winger while the back 4 spread wide to form the back 4. The reason is that German clubs are often press oriented, meaning it was difficult for others teams to build up short. So Xabi applied circular rotations, meaning that when opposition are pressing to the center backs, it passes it to the left back who deliberatly carries the ball and drifts toward the pivot. The right pivot simultaneously shifts on the right and takes on the right flank position. Due to this inward movement, it narrows down the front markers which frees up the right space for the right pivot who has a path to break throught the first line of pressure. But if opposition sits in low block this tactic can become ineffective. So to counter this, Alonso used a tactic that is a miw between Guardiola's in City and Zerbi's Brighton. For example when one of the center back passes the ball to one of the pivot, the pivot quickly passes the ball back to him. It creates a pressing trigger to the markers to close the 2 players down which indirectly frees up spaces for the second pivot to receive an actual pass. It attract markers who are behind him. Due to this it creates an open space between the lines where one of the forwards drop deeper to receive the ball as a third man, which then draws one of the center backs and frees up space for the striker as fourth man. They use oppositio'ns press as a weapon against themselves. But if opposition, rather pressing 1 v 1 than pressing ni numbers with low press strategy, it also can be frawned. So to adress this, Xabi intentionally overload one presser with 2. WHe the center back is looking for a pass from one of the pivots, Palacios, who is close to Xhaka, intentionally jumps right in with Xhaka It confuses XHaka's marker who is being ready for a 1 v 1. Once the ball goes th Xhaka, Palacios is unmarked and becomes the third man to avance up the pitch. When entering in the second phase of build up, Alonso uses a combination between Guardiola's positionnal play and Diniz's relationnism. After the first phase, both pivots moves vertically to each other. Also their asymetrical approach makes Leverkusen play more on the right side of the pitch. It triggers the narrow right forward to shit to that side as well, creating a 6 box structure on one side of the pitch. At the same time Grimaldo the left back drifts wide to imitate his partner's winger role. If opposition commit a lot of mens to cover the 6 men box, then Bayer can easily switch play toward the left towards Grimaldo who only has one player to defend them. If they spread to cover the opposite player then it can create a 6 v 5 superiority on the other side where they can easily progress the ball with one touch. He uses Diniz's relationnism to overloard one side of the pitch and Pep's positionnal play by using the box tactic. When they drift into the attacking phase, they switch from a 4 2 4 to a 3 2 5 structure where Grimaldo finally advances to act like his opposite partner, Frimpong. But rather playing this way it's generally used to trick the opposition's markers. If Leverkusen use a 3 2 5 shape, opposition often mark them using a 5 4 2 defensive structure. It makes difficult for Bayer to pass throught the block and often force them to rely on long balls. So to solve this one of the inverted forwards from the front 5 drops deeper and act as a roaming number 10. At the same time it gives both the wide center backs options to carry the ball forward while partnering Palacios with the roaming player. This makes the opposition shift to focus on the incoming center backs. It creates open spaces between the second and third line of defense. When receiving the ball, these players quickly join the front 4 and try to exploit the back line. Once they actually get near the box using this, the front 5 do the remaining work where they shift the entire opposition into one side. To achieve this they often pass the ball wide to the side player while the player inside the half spaces makes a deliberate wide run toward the flanks and draws his marker. This movement then frees up a striker without a man, leading the back line to spread towards him. When the ball is passed to the half space player it effectivly draws most of the opposition to the first half of the pitch which leaves the far right and right space player with just one marker. So a quick cross to them exposes the opposition's defense while creating a prime socring opportunity for Bayer Leverkusen. However Xabi's tactics trully emerges when out of possession. Witohut the ball they press in a 5 2 3 setup. The main objective was always to protect the center channels. So he created an interesting star line pattern to adress this. For example, when opposition build up from the back, Alonso asks his front 3 to be narrow with both of the pivots just behind them, creating a compact star shape. It creates a numerical superiority in the center with a box 4 behind the striker. Even if the opposition still paly throught the center, Alonso encourages his wide center backs to step up as well makig it almost impossible to advance centrally. This forces the opposition to go wide. But as soon opposition plays wide the wingbacks quickly jumps onto them, creating a one side overload. The far sided center back track the wide options. It makes the opposition to go back and switches the play or trust their aerial ability. Even if the opposition breaks Bayer's perssing pattern, the team quickly transition into a 5 4 1 shape with the inverted forwards becoming the wide miedfielders. Due to the 3 center backs and the double pivots shileding the central areas, it helps to keep the opposition attack wide with the wingbacks and wide miedfielders to protect the flank. WHen they win the ball back using this, rather than quickly launching counter attack, Alonso let the opposition press them more in which he invites the opposition to couter press and let them commit more numbers forward. As the opposition is fully into their counterpress, Bayer quickly execute a long ball toward the forwards who are being left isolated. It makes them the most dangerous counter attacking sides as they use opposition's psychologie to their advantage. It can be only achieved with the player's roles. Rather than a traditionnal back 3, they form a back 4 with the right center back covering space behind the right wingback who is pushing up. The left back stays deep and takes the role of a wingback. Rather than being a traditionnal wingback, Grimaldo is one of the most versatile player in the squad who can operates as a winger during attacks, invert as a pivot during build up and even act as a third number 10. However, he still fills his duties as a fullback when neede unlike Frimpong who had been assigned to a right winger role. Frimpong's positionning is even proactive than Trent as you might see him as a right winger, as a numer 10, even as a striker in various occasions. he also serves as press releasers due to his positionning for the central players. Palacios is a box to box miedfielder as he drops deep alongside Xhaka in the 4 plus 2 build up, then advances into spaces between the lines during the attack. Xhaka is the deep lying playmaker, being the main man launching counter attacks. Hoffman plays as a narrow attacking miedfielder giving Frimpong more spaces to take on the right wing while the right winger mostly controls the right half space. Wirtz in the other hand plays in a more wider role. When Grimaldo stays back to form a back 4, Wirtz takes the left wing to maintain the width. He also serves as a key playmaker with Grimaldo who drops between the lines to connect the miedfield with the attack. In order to create spaces for Wirtz between the lines, Xabi assigns both his center backs as ball players. He encourages them cto carry the ball and draw markers higher to open gaps between the lines. Boniface in front is used as a pressing forward. Due to his speed and strenght he plays a massive role for pressing the opposition from during the build up and in the counterpressing if they loose the ball. Their style os to blend the control with attacking mindset. In defense in order to apply a pattern at pressing they play with a high line and apply pressure across the opposition's half. In the ifnal third they are excellent at working the ball into the box, using close connexions and driving the ball at defense to create spaces between the lines or flanks. Due to the close proximity of players, Alonso always favored short passes It's a possession based team who also excelles in counter attacks. A team that plays with a structure but also without. This is a team using opposition's counter press against them while also using counter press against their opponents
&t=46s How Brazil Won The 2002 World Cup | Brazil's Joga Bonito Tactics |
Some think that it's obvious that the team should have win the tournament with the team they have. However Emerson Lia during preparation and qualifying matches, only won 4 on 11 matches. Scaloni then came one year before the WC and Brazil managed to qualify only with 3 points advance. Brazil set a formation for the tournament that generally looked like a 3 4 3 with Marcos gk, Lucio, Edmilson and Roque as the 3 cb, Cafu and Roberto Carlos as the wingbacks. Kleberson and Silva as the central miedfielders and the R trio in front with Ronaldinho, Rivaldo and Ronaldo Nazario. Only variation of this was a 5 3 2 or 3 5 2 where Ronaldinho would be set as an attacking miedfielder while Juninho would play instead of Kleberson as a more defensive minded miedfielder. Marcos often made long balls high up the pitch looking for Ronaldo. Ronaldinho and Rivaldo would come narrower to pick up the second ball. Roque and Lucio, the wide center backs, were more conservatives with the ball, playing risk free passes into Gilberto Silva or Edmilson who was the central center back. Playing with only 2 central miedfielders meant that they could be at times overloaded in the miedfield. So Edmilson played the role of the libero, pushing up in the miedfield to the point that the formation sometimes looked like a 4 3 3. But Edmilson could also stay deeper and look for a ball into Gilberto Silva; This was the case especially when Juninho came alongside him in the miedfield as he tended to be more offensive and drifted high up the pitch. And crucially when Edmilson played deeper, then Roque and Lucio would shift into wider regions. This gave Cafu and Roberto Carlos 2 position defining wingbacks. Their passing and positionnal rotations quickly dragged mens out of position. (modifié) And Brazil was comfortable exploiting both the wide areas and the central regions. 3 of their matches were against teams that played with 3 center backs, Costa Rica, Turkey and Germany. So Roberto Carlos and Cafu were found in wide regions to be in 1 v 1 against their men. They had the physical as well as the technical ability to breeze past their men and make the cross When wide regions were targeted, the role of the forwards could vary. They could push up into the half spaces ALternativly Ronaldinho in particular could move to the left channel as a more traditionnal winger while Rivaldo and Ronaldo would shift across. Juninho if he was starting would push higher to take the place vacated by Ronaldinho. Edmilson would then push up in the miedfield to ensure they would not be overpowered in that area on the transition.
Diego Simeone's 2020/21 Tactics | Atletico Madrid 20/21 Tactics | How Atleti Have Evolved |
How Pep Dismantled Ancelotti | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 4-0 Real Madri
d| We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the miedfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the miedfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the miedfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations. When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs sometimes only trakced by midfielder.
Tactical Analysis : Spain 5 - 3 Croatia | The Two Sides Of Enrique's Spain |
During this match Spain, had 4,3 expected goals while Croatia had 3,7 expected goals. Croatia early on weren't looking to press very high. So Unai Simon could play sure to the center backs. Initially Croatia did defend in a 4 1 4 1 with Brozovic being deeper and looking to sweep up. There was so a man to man structure with a 3 v 3. Busquets would have spaces in his deeper positions to dictate the game. He ended with the most touches and passes on the pitch right behind Aymeric Laporte, a center back. Modric would often look to push up alongside Petkovic creating a 4 4 2 whilst trying to use their cover shadows in order to close down the passing lanes to Busquets. So Spain needed a 3 v 2 advantage in deeper regions to keep possession lore easily. By having Azpilicueta often starting a lot deeper from the left side, they managed to do that whilst Gaya was much more offensive on the right side, pushing up to the left. But thsi defensive shape could cause Croatia problems in the miedfield as they were now 3 v 2 down. With Koke dropping alongside Busquets, Spain could switch to a double pivot while Pedri would push up and had plenty of spaces between the lines at times as the Spain's front 3 stayed high and wide, forcing Croatia 's center backs deep. So if s Spanish pivot was receiving the ball and Brozovic was drawn into pressin this would create even more spaces between the lines for Pedri to receive and look to create. At 2 1 up for Spain, we saw these problems for Croatia with Modric and Kovacic pressing the double pivots. It left Brozovic as the sole miedfielder left deeper. So Azpilicueta pushes into the miedfield to draw Brozovic, meaning that Pedrihas now spaces between the lines. He can advances and plays to Ferran who is often high and wide who finds Azpilicueta with a pin point cross who had continued his run. But with a single pivot, Koke and Pedri would both push high and wide into the half spaces.In second half time, Croatia used a 4 2 3 1 when defending at times which would allow the miedfield to stay thigh at Busquets and limit his influence. But before this, they had problems with Spain's miedfield creating issues for their 4 4 2. Koke and Pedri would be hard to pick up especially with Gaia and Ferran providing the wide. Spain was also excellent at overloading left hand side with laporte pushing higher up and Gaya providing the width. It would allow Sarabia to come narrow, which would then Pedri to drift around the pitch but often move deeper to the left hand side. Laporte and Pedri would often look to pass to the left back on the blind side of the fullback if he was poorly tracked.In second half Pedri often combined with Ferran who had switched over the left hand side Ferran would often look for a cross into the back post with Azpilicueta pushing high up as well as they looked to overload Gvardiol. With Rebci being slow to track back, that meant that Gvardiol was caught in 2 v 1 with the chooice to either moving narrow to track Koke, either staying wide to track Ferran. We also saw that when Gvardiol was wider with more spaces between the center backs. It led to a massive chance with Koke being able to make the run between them. Croatia's best moments was during transitions when Spain having pushed 2 miedfielders high up in possession. Spain faced problems in transitions, especially in the left hand side. Rebic could receive the ball and drive high up the pitch Orsic and Pasalic were bring in to operate on the left hand side as they were more effective. . They would often during transitions force Azpilicueta to remain narrow. It would allow Orsic to have spaces out wide to receive. He would look then to swing a cross. And this led to a big chance in extra time. We also saw some of this in the equalizing goal with Pasalic picking the ball in good position in the miedfield on the wrong side of Fabian Ruiz. Orsic is then in great position providing the width in the left hand side. Orsic then makes the perfect cross so Pasalic can finish as Croatia were committing bodies into the box
How Deschamps Learnt From Germany | Tactical Analysis : France 2-2 Portugal |
Santos stick to his 4 1 4 1 for Portugal while Deschamps went for a 4 2 3 1 with Tolisso on the right wing. From the goalkick, Varane and Kimpembe would split to give Lloris options on either side whilst a pivot completed the diamond. But when they did choose to press higher, Portugal were pretty effective with Jota and Bernardo covering either wide man and Ronaldo on the pivot. Even if France could have use a double pivot to counter this, this was riskier so they often opted for long balls. Generally Portugal weren't looking to press high partirulary in open play. Instead they would be shifting into 4 1 4 1 shape. When defending they dropped sometimes into what looked like a 4 5 1 rather than pressing in the final third. France looked to take advantage in the wide regions just like Germany previsouly did during their 4 2 victory over Portugal. It could involve Tolisso dropping deeper almost like a center back whilst Pogba and Kanté create a double pivot. This would allow Koundé to advance much higher down right as would Hernandez on the far side to provide the width. Just like against Germany it could mean that Franc's backline could be outnumber at times. So if the fullbacks defended wide there would be gaps in the half spaces. But if they defended too narrow, the fullbacks would be. Griezmann being on the right inside half space, he could drag Guerreiro here and free spaces for Koundé to push up on the right. Occasionally we saw Kanté dropping as a left center back with Pogba and Tolisso often creating the double pivot. But more effective way was Pogba splitting between the center backs early on and this would allow the fullbacks to push up and to provide France the necessary width. As Kanté and Tolisso were deeper they didn't have the same passing range than Pogba. As Portugal would content to sitting, it would mean that Ronaldo wouldn't press him, allowing Pogba to dictate the tempo of the game. He ended with the most passes of the match. But Pogba was also much more penetrative from deep, often looking for balls over the top or throught the lines to a man making a run. Mbappé may have been offisde, but Pogba finding him still was a warning sign. Benzema's second half was a better example of this. Pogba played a perfect pass to Benzema for him to finish. As Pogba dropped between the center backs, it created a 3 v 1 situation against Ronaldo who was alone in front, giving Pogba all the time he needed to head up and pick a pass. But as there would still be 2 v 1 situation anyway, Pogba oushed into the miedfield which would trigger Tolisso to push into the inside right position to create a front 5. Griezmann had the freedome to play behind them, joining the miedfield when needed as well as pushing up higher when he liked, often rotating with Benzema and Tolisso. With only Ronaldo high, France switched into a 2 2 6. So Tolisso, replaced later by Coman, would be the inside forward with koundé at right back. With 2 cb, a double pivot with Kanté and Pogba, Griezmann is free to drop deep or push high with Tolisso in the inside right channel. With the constant interchanging in the front mens, meant it was difficult for the center backs to pick one man. This leads up to the first penalty as Pogba was initially in a center back position so Tolisso was deeper as a pivot alongside Kanté. Then Pogba spread the ball into the wide while Tolisso advanced into the frontline. Hernandez and Mbappé on the left dragged Bernardo and Semedo, creating a wide gap in the defense. With 3 mens in front being narrow, it forced Dias and Pepe to remain narrow. It created gaps into the half spaces that Pogba could expose, leading to the foul. The portugal wingers like Jota and Bernardo were willing to track back much deeper, preventing France's fullbacks to overload here. When Portugal had the ball on the play, France generally shifted to a 4 4 2 shape. Griezmann and Benzema would press high making it difficult for the center backs to progress throught the center. Sometimes they could stay deeper to cover the pivot. To compensate for the potential 3 v 2 advantage, Tolisso defended more narrow, not as a traditionnal winger. That meant Guerreiro was often free in the wide regions. but Renato Sanches would often drop into a left center back position This could draw Tolisso higher up the pitch leaving Guerreiro a lot of spaces. And Jota and Ronaldo would cause overloads down to the left handside by coming across. But they weren't able to make the most of them. But it was often Danilo Perrera who would drop between the 2 center backs to form a 3 v 2 to ease the pressure against the defense. The disdvantage of this is that their initial 3 v 2 advantage in the miedfield now became a 2 v 2. So we saw Ronaldo dropping from center forward to an advancing miedfield position a lot, trying and create this. But he wasn't often able to get turned. Mbappé was often defending wide left. And he isn't always the best with tracking back. So Portugal's right back could at times overlap Bernardo Silva, leading to some dangerou
situations.
But knowing there was one less men at the center, United could look to tigh up that City's men fairly easily in that zone. But this shape caused even more problems to Cyt due to the Rashford Walker dynamic. Walker being high gave Rashford too much of a head start on transitions. It forced City to restrategize with Walker and Bernardo Silva having to rotate. It was more dangerous than having Walker in that zone. But from the deeper zone Walker was less secure with his passing. He was often forcing passes into dangerous zones which could result into turnovers. The narrow 4 afforded Maino and Amrabat and the freedom to be more man oriented on the 2 creators, following them aroud the pitch and looking the make their lives miserables. They were willing to track them even when they looked for rooms in the fullbacks. But United's defensive shape was not impenetrable and Haaland would look to drop at times to play in one of the rushing miedfielders. This worked well when Haaland's touch was on point. But it was often not the case. On the left De Bruyne and Gvardiol would often switch roles. It meant De Bruyne would have more room to pick up a pass. But City looked the most dangerous when De Bruyne and Foden not spilt the pitch in hald but looked to overload one side. Since united pivots had 2 mens to pick up, it created opportunities of combinations. But with the 2 attacking mied committing to one side, it would often mean that during transitions, the far side fullback would potentially have room to attack if they received the ball. ALternativly a quick switch would also mean a guaranteed 1 v 1 against the fullback. 2. United were pretty comfortable men to men against the creators. But when the ball got wide one of the biggest game changers was having one of the progressors make a late run to create a 3 v 2 advantage and try to break United's defensive line shape. But when Kovacic or Rodri made the run they left the other pivot vulnerable on the transition as Walker would be instantly moving out wide to cover Rashford. So it leads United to play pretty easily throught the center, allowing United to settle with long and quick switches to the other side, like the one that led to Man United's second goal. Pep needed to change something and that change came from the magic Doku provided. Balls were passed much more on the left side to Doku. By comparision, Bernardo Silva had much less balls on the right side of the pitch during second half time compared to the first half time. This lead to an intense battle between Doku and Bissaka with both having their moments. But it's throught the secondary impact on Foden that Doku's impact was best shown. With Gvardiol coming in, Man United had to double team against Doku. That meant that with Stones also being a pivot, Foden had more spaces in this zone. Foden had during the second half more key passes and shot compared to the first half. 3. Jude Bellingham combined that traditionnal physicality of english players with the technical flair that let him fits in modern day football.
Bellingham back then when he was 16 years old was playing in diferent positions for his developing and to create also room for more senior players. In classic 4 4 2 he was more acostumed with playing as the central miedfielder role. But one field where he didn't stand out from the others was his passing who was quite average. He couldn't be the metronome who could break the game, open with long range passes at will. When it came to pass attempted and progressive passes he was below in ranking during the 2019 2020 season. It's where he was playing as a pivot who could take either an attacking either defensive role that Bellingham thrived. His pace combined with his technical ability was imediatly noticed. Half of his appearances were out wide on paper at lst since he would start out wide and at tiems hold his width when the game demanded it particulary when he was on the left handside. Bellingham here would develop his off the ball intelligence. Bellingham would often drift centrally into the half spaces with hthe freedom to find pockets of spaces to make the difference. He would often do that, receiving and looking to lay on teamates instead of him at times. It was his ability to take on a man and create a shoot that stood out. In Dortmund, Bellingham kept progressing. 4. Dortmund took advantage of his wide asset of skills as he could take a role anchor deeper alongside Delany, Witsel or Dahoud. When Dortmund was playing in 4 3 3 Bellingham was tossed with oen of the highest roles on the left handside, granting him a lot more freedom. His ball security increassed. His risky role however meant that he was dispossessed more than 92% of miedfielders and had pass completion bottom 20% for miedfielders. As one of the hubs of the side, Bellingham could not solely rely on his off the ball ability any longer. He was the man often receiving from the center backs. He made just that making himself more and more available to receive the ball. This was complemented by his increased maturity on possession of the ball as he showed more discenement, He acted more like a conductor. However his passing was still lacking a bit, especially his game changing passes. His attributes however still start to go from very good category for a young player to world classas he was given the most advanced role whatever it was in a 4 3 3 or inn a more defensive 4 2 3 1 alongside a more defensive player like Witsel. When he received the ball into the central congested zones, he was too big, too quick and too technical for almost every opposing miedfielder. It became comon especially during the transitions for Bellingham to pick the ball deep and drifting pass the opposition's miedfielders. His attempted take on were at least superior to 85% of central miedfielders in the league. Also his passing game evolved and progressing, eventually making him a complete miedfielder.
His progressive passes, passes into the final third and long balls completed increased. Dortmund generally are a ball dominant side that try to pin their opposition inside their own box. Therefore Bellingham was heavily involved in the final third play, using his ability of drifting between the lines unoticed to engage quick combinations. He was involving himself more in the opposite box, making more and more last minute runs to get a goalscoring opportunity or a goal scoring creating chance. For somebody playing as a traditionnal miedfield Bellingham already in the past as a lot of involvment in that final third.His touches in the box and his line breaking runs, he became a game changer for Dortmund.His shoot creating actions as well as his decision making were in progression. Ancelotti was the perfect man to get the best from Bellingham's new form. That's why Bellingham's move to real madrid was perfect. ot only Benzema going in Saudi meant that there was a hole in the 9 position, bu Ancelotti was also cursed with having too many high quality miedfielders. So the miedfield diamond was the solution for Ancelotti.Modric and Kross were aging but both were still far superior orchestrators from deep. Bellingham was a monster at carrying the ball from deep with his feet while Valverde had the ability to provide similar athleticism from deep. So instead found himself at the cutting edge of the diamond. When the game called for it, Bellingham could still momentally drop deeper to be the extra option. 6. His increased possession and security were still important in these deeper phases. But now with the forwards being both natural wingers who will take the drift wide, it was vital for Bellingham to provide a strong central presence. He didn't play as a centre forward or even as a false 9. He was very much an attacking miedfielder. He revealed his ability to find spaces to receive between the lines. He thrived in this role with world class miedfielders being able to find him being on the receiving end of progressive passes. As he developed a strong relationship with the forwards, his ability in tigher regions also improved. Bellingham often happened to be into the box at the right place at the right time. His shoots were now taken more at optimal positions compared to before where he had to make more long shoots. His goals and expected goals vastly increased as a result.
Why Argentina deserved to win the World Cup | Tactical Analysis Scaloni starting Di Maria on the left wing is not something that many would have expected. And It was a genius move. Argentina took advantage of France's passive nature. They knew that they would not or very rarely press their centrebacks. So they already had a secure base to build up from. They used a double pivot with Messi inverting and Molina pushing up on that side. Rabiot could press De Paul more but with Messi behind him, he is not doing that. This mean that Argentina had a 4 v 2 or 5 if you include Molina. Those pivots were in these pockets of space all the times. Especially Enzo Fernandez. With Rabiot and Tchouaméni very deep, just like Griezmann close to the defensive line, nobody was picking up Argentina's pivot at a point. Given spaces in central areas, Argentina could start their combination game. finding players between the lines or finding third man run. Since it was easy to breach throught the french press, Argentina created loads of situations where either Rabiot or Tchouaméni stepped up to deal with whoever was driving forward. And Messi could just drop off the shoulder and pikc it up without any trouble at you. When you have this congestion around Messi with Rabiot and Tchouaméni, France left spaces in the left. Mc Allister pushed high up to force Koundé inside and free Di Maria. It's ok for France to have his back line to be narrow and to leave spaces behind. But for doing this you need pressure on the ball. Di Maria was subbed off probably too early. Because Argentina was no longer pressing that much compared to the first half and their defensive line became deeper. 1. There were less pressure on the wide centerbacks. But Argentina's agressivity on the flank meant that France couldn't find any combination in the middle. But some minors signs showed that the match could change like Hernandez and Mbappé getting the ball more easily. Without Di Maria and with a much deeper line, transitions were more difficult. Both France's goals ocurred after turn overs in the miedfield. On the first goal before the penalty, ENzo Fernandez gave the ball under the pressure of Rabiot while Messi lost the ball to Coman before Mbappé's second goal.
&t=445s The Barcelona ‘Pivot’ - How Busquets mastered football’s hardest role Back then when It was decided to promote Guardiola in the Barcelona A team, people criticized it because he was described as a player that had little to no strenght, a player that couldn't defend and that was not good in the air. But one year later, he was part of Cruyff's famous dream team playing as a pivot at the base of this miedfield diamond. Despite lack of athletism, Guardiola had some qualities that were necessary here. It's technic and insight. With fluid movements, triangles and the endless ball circulations, he could play football just as he wanted. He also had incredible positionnal sense. Having Guardiola here allowed him to inttercept passes, break up play and even applying pressure, not by sprinting 30 meters but by moving a few meters at the right moment. Before retiring, Guardiola suggested that players like him had become extinct because of the game becoming more tactical and physical. It was when Guardiola became manager of Barcelona's B tema in 2007 that he discovered Sergio Busquets. Guaridola promoting Busquets as a metronome of his possession's machine in Barcelona A team was similar to Cruyff's promotion of Guardiola. Busquets just like Guardiola appeared as too lanky, not strong enough, but was a master of technic and more crucially, position. The fact that Guardiola put a very young Sergio Busquets at the heart of the game was already enough saying about his potential. As the most central player you are at the hub of possession. 1. The connexion between all the nodes in the network. It's throught you that the ball is circulated. He was constantly forming triagles with his teamates to create passing options and find the third man which is fundamental concept is possession based football. But identifying space is also very important here. Scanning every few seconds, tracking spaces on that pitch can look easy at first. But it's not. Adding that to executing the perfect pass under heavy pressure is very difficult. His technic and passing ability thought the liens are also exceptionnal. It's not a coincidence that he was often positionned perfectly to intercept a pass. Busquets was a better version of Guardiola since he also had the capacity of being a miedfield destroyer with those long, telescopic legs and exceptionnal timing. He made more interceptions and tackles than every Barcelona's players every year since 2015. He is also very capable on the air, accomoding to the diminutive stature of his meidfield colleagues. 2. La Tactique qui a Changé la CARRIÈRE de Pep Guardiola !
How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 1-2 Manchester United 1. YouTube Football Made Simple How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester Cit... City dominated the possession but United still outplayed them. Man United was happy to not have the ball, not having to press very high on the pitch. It meant that City's center backs got on the ball pretty easily. United allowed City to have possession as long as it was not in the center of their own half. Having Bruno in center forward, it was difficult to get the ball on the double pivots. He would drop on one of the pivots. Mc Tominay, an attacking miedfielder would push onto the remaining pivot. Ten Hag was willing to leave spaces out wide if it meant that half spaces were closed for City. Garnacho and Rashford tucked infield. United were playing narrow 4 2 4 with 2 mobiles engines leading the defensive efforts. Ten Hag did this because he noticed the shape City had used during recent matches with Pep using his fullbacks ore as traditionnal fullbacks. It would allowed the wingers like Foden or Silva to play more centrally into their natural positions. But now City hardly found anyone between the lines and with the double pivots covered, Bernardo Silva would drop deep to try to make a 3 v 2 situation against Fernandez and Mc Tominay. Foden drifted infield on the left hand side. So City's miedfield was often split into 3 attempted progressors and 2 attempted creators. But this hypothetical 3 v 2 was more a 4 v 2 in United's favor because the front 4 was so norrow and compact in his space. Ten Hag was willing to let City's fullbacks to get on the ball as they were barely a threat compared to the central players. It made it difficult to find the progressors and easier to stop the fullbacks who were not grade 1 v 1. Kovacic and Silva often dropped into the half spaces vacated left by the fullbacks
The word fullback was used first at the beginning of the XXth century. Back then football was mostly played in 2 3 5 formations. Or 2 3 3 2. And fullbacks referred to the last defensive lines, composed of 2 players. It slowly transitionned as an outwide position as the back 4 grew in popularity. But still their main focus had been their defensive ability. Over time thankfully due to exceptionnal fullbacks, the role started to get more recognition. As defending teams got tigher and tigher at the back, the idea that wide defenders could be now an attacking option started to become the norm. It became the standard that the fullbacks were no longer just defenders but athletic players excellent at crossing Great teams like Brazil during the Cafu and Roberto Carlos era, built their teams aroud exceptionnal offensive fullbacks. But then opposites teams foud new ways to create counter attacks and exploit the spaces left by the fullbacks behind them. As a result, managers like Pep Guardiola started placing their fullbacks in a more central positio to facilitate moving between these lines. Thus the inverted fullback started to gain popularity. The modern fullback is all about control. Over the past 2 decades the biggest trend in football has seen an increase in the reliance on build up nd a team's ability to control the tempo of the game. This is because, if successful, a well organized build up allows a team to create chances in a much more predictable way and allows the team to manipulate the right spaces. Back when the long balls were still the most comon form of attack, It was hard to predict what would happen when the striker went to meet the ball in the air. It could be flicked on, It might bounce between the lines. Or they could loose the aerial duel to the defender meaning it was harder to create chance in a pattern that could be replicated in training. 1. Made popular by Guardiola back when he was in Bayern Munich, the inverted fullback allow a team to overload the center of the pitch and forces the opposition the make a chooice. If the fullback is followed into the center, then it frees up a route to the wing for the ball to progress. If he is not followed, then the ball can be circulated straight thought the center of the pitch, as the team in possession likely has a big numerical overload. Now the advantage of the inverted fullback are not only being seen during the build up. In the opposition's half, the extra player in the middle means that a team can more easily circulate the possession and when the team loose possession, this extra player in the cover means it's easier the opposition creating a quick counter attack. The Trent Alexander Arnorld at Liverpool is the best example maybe. During the 2022 2023 season, Liverpool had difficulties stopping the opposition's counter attack. They got often caught up as Trent pushed up on the flank and leave ackers of space at the bank for the opposition to exploit. However towards the end of the season, Klopp adopted a slight positionnal change. Rather than overlapping the flank, Trent would move into a more central position. With an extra center player, this gave Liverpool more defensive cover. But most importantly it opened up the pitch for Trent who now had more spaces to use his incredible passing rang to pick out the players ahead of him. No longer Trent provided assists from crosses but he was rather more involved in the build up, making lines breaking passes and switching plays. But an inverted fullback doesn't necessary have the same function than an another inverted fullback. Take the ZInchenko example from Arsenal. Zinchenko's movement inside is often used as a decoy. If opposition followed then it frees up space. If he is not followed he has now space to receive the ball. He uses more short passes than Trent who rely more on long range passes.
. Trent is more focused on immadiate progression forward while Zinchenko more often rotate with the rest of the team in the miedfield especially. ZInchenko operates in a slightly restricted low risk low reward position, looking to disrupt the opposition with calculated movements. While Trent operates on a wider high risk, high reward role with longer more dangerous passes. Arteta comes from positionnal school of thought. So he wants to dominate the game with precise passes moving up the pitch. And so ZInchenko is used to serve this function. In the other hand, Klopp's style is a lot more heavy metal, controlling the game with constant pressure and quick attacks.And Trent filt this mould perfectly with his longer passing range. In Gironia, Gutierrez has a less restricted role as he is more a player here to come either to add support centrally forming a double pivot, either coming in others spaces to create overloads whetever it's needed. While the other fullback need to provide defensive cover. But by allowing to join the attack and shift to the other flank, it quicklycan create numerical overloads.
&t=539s 4-1-4-1 Tactics Explained | 4-1-4-1 Strengths & Weaknesses | Formation Principles
The 4 1 4 1 formation is often used by teams that like building from the back, which mean that the goalkepper must have great ball distribution ability. A great example of that is Neuer who allow his team to play in a high line since as a sweeper keeper he would be ready to close down any space made by the strikers and help the team to maintain control of the pitch. The 2 centerbacks need to have the ability to play under pressure and provide key passes forward and breaking the pressing lines. The idela combo would ahve one player capable ot carrying the ball forward while the other has a more versatile passing range, playing longer balls from deep but also providing more defensive cover. The centerbacks Carvalho and John Terry under José Mourinho set the record of conceding only 15 goals in the 2004 2005 season. Defensivly, the fullbacks will be tasked to cover the opposition's wingers. On the attack they will be required to push up to add width, creating overloads outwide and delivering the ball into the box. Ideally they will play on the side with their main foot. Some modern systems like Guardiola's one means that fullbacks can drift inside more frequently adding miedfield support and creating more passing angles. One holding miedfielder is one of the most crucial if not the most crucial position in this formation. He will be drifting side to side to help the team move the ball out of tight spaces. He will need to be great at progressing the ball but also have a strong physical presence to stop any run behind the miedfield line. Compared to similar lines up such as the 4 3 3, the holding miedfielder in a 4 1 4 1 does have a slightly more defensive mentality. Philipp Lahm executed this position to perfection. 1. He was also the focal point during the build up. The 2 more advanced center miedfielders need creativity and understanding with teamates as they need to join the attack and drop deep to help in the build up consistently during the whole match. They will rotate with the wingers or help to create overloads out wide. They must be technically gifted players while the wingers are usually the quickest players of the line up. The ideal line up would have the inverted wingers on both flanks. meaning they are more prone to dridft inside and freeing up the flanks for the fullbacks to stretch the backline. But having the wingers stretching the backline can also be benefical as it benefits the center miedfielders to attack. The wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They must deliver balls into the box or making runs onto the back post. Finally the lone striker will sometimes be used as the focal point in front and will need to have excellent hold up play with the ability of laying out the ball for the center miedfielders of the wingers. The ideal striker here would be a false 9 vacating into the spaces in front of the backline and creating spaces for the players to attack ahead of him. Francesco Totti is a good example of that. This 4 1 4 1 formation is versatile allowing to have a lot of cover on the pitch from side to side meaning there will always be a passing line options available. When defending it can shift into either a 5 4 1 either a 4 5 1. 1. When attacking it could shift into a 3 4 3 if the holding miedfielder drop between the 2 centerbacks and the fullbacks are pushing up. Or if the wingers stay high and out wide, it can shift into a 4 3 3 formation. The presence of a lone striker mena that a long play from gk into the stirker is not ideal as the front 4 would need to push up to provide help and that means that if the team looses the ball, it can create a gap between the meidfield line and the defensive line. However if used in the right way to bypass a heavy press it can be quickly deadly and create counter attacks. If played against a 4 3 3 formation, it will be more difficult to outnumber the center. However it can quickly get the upper hand on the flanks given the fullbacks wingers combo. The wingers would need to start wide to pin the opposition's fullbacks and prevent them to adding to the press. This means fullbacks usually have space to receive the ball. However the team need to be patient in moving the ball to them. This is because if the team pass the ball directly into t fulback, the opposition can quickly read this and close off a back pass and forward option meaning the team is trapped on the flank. Realistically they would want to move the ball to the fullback indirectly throught the center to force the opposition to move closer to the center, givint the fullbacks more spaces and giving him time to push up past the winger to receive. To do this the holding miedfield will usually be shadow mark by the stirker so having one of the center mieds dropping either side of the striker 2. If the opposition plays as 4 4 2 it's much harder to gain an advantage on the flanks. However there is an extra player available on the pitch. The difficulty with this formation is the initial 2 v 2 with the centerbacks and the 2 strikers. So a goalkepper with the ability to play with his feet is crucial to help his team finding spaces. In this scenario, the fullbacks are not as useful during the build up. In the other hand, the holding meidfielder will be important by droppingdeep between the centerbacks to help creating a 3 v 2. If the holding miedfielder is pressed then one of the 2 others center meids will be free and will have space ahead of him to attack the backline
&t=37s Pourquoi le Maroc pourrait déclencher une révolution dans les tactiques de football Morocco's starting formation in WC 2022 was a 4 3 3. However when they defended they rarely looked like this. It was more a 4 1 4 1. Given the modern play style of occupying dangerous spaces, with loosely fixed positions, Morocco's answer to this was to now allow team to move the ball into these positions. Areas such as half spaces were difficult to penetrate. given the extremely tight lines meaning any player in these positions could quickly be surrounded. The central area in front of the defense was excellently patrollled by Amrabat, constantly shifting from side to side, boxing in opponents and linking defense with miedfield. While being tight between the lines, Morocco was also very narrow, leaving spaces out wide which is their way of luring opposition into a trap. But not only these spaces in front of the defense were very difficult to penetrate, Morocco made the first pass from the opposition as difficult as possible. En Nesyri as lone striker wouldn't man mark the opposition's holding miedfield. He would rather shift to ensure the centrebacks couldn't easily pass the ball forward.If by chance they were able to move forward, the 2 miedfielders were almost always correctly positionned to force a pass backwards. This structure would force the opposition to play to ball out wide.or attempt harder to execute such as long switches in play. But all of this played into Morocco's favour with their team having their most dynamic and agressive players i Zyhech and Hakimi on the right. And Boufal and Mazraoui on the left, ready to close down the opposition. And if winning the ball back had the pace and technical ability to instantly create dangerous counter attacks. Eventually this would force the opposition circulating the possession around the back line. 1. Now it's also important to note that while Morocco certainly played with a defensive mentality, It was far from what is comonly referred as parking the bus. The defensive line wasn't too deep. And the miedfield was quick to close down any player in the center. In the quarter final, Portugal would often shift into a 3 2 build up pattern, with Morocco's miedfielders adapting to this change and man marking the double pivot, again forcing playing out wide. Given this compact central block, the opposition would often struggle to get their key players on the ball, leading a rather interesting effect. Portugal's main playing style involved getting their creative players such as Bruno Fernandes and Bernardo Silva on the ball between the lines, forcing the opposition's defenders to make a chooice and eventually trying to free up spaces for Felix, Ramos or Dalot on the overlap.However their inability to do so due to Morocco's defensive discipline led to frustration for the miedfielders who are used to set the tempo for their team. And in an attempt to be more useful, would often themselves dropping deeper and deeper to receive the ball from the centerbacks, at times ending with 5 players behind the ball. Now it can be ok on paper to have the keys players behind the ball. But it limits their attacking power, as now they can't outnumber Morocco's defense, meaning Morocco don't have to make a chooice on which space to cover given the fact that they were often in a numerical advantage like 5 v 3 situations. n attack. 2. This resulted into the opposition's being completly disjoncted. resorting to long balls over the miedfield hoping to win any knockdowns. Again it played into Morocco's favour as they had the space to attack forward. And pick out their most dangerous players. The clash new vs old was at his peak during the match Spain vs Morocco. SPain ended the game with 77% possession. They also had 2 twice the amount of shoot compared to Morocco. But the quality of the chances tells a lot. With Spain averaging an xg of 1,5 and Morocco 1,4. Against France in the semi finals, they were forced to play more agressive football as they were 1 0 down in the early minutes of the match. And they aere able, despite not scoring, putting France on the back foot for long periods during this match. Morocco took elements from Italian catenaccio in 1960s and zonal marking from in the 1980s to create a modern twist on the defensive block, sprinkled in with trending tactics such as a higher defensive line, and offensive fullbacks on attack. 3. Why Morocco really could win the World Cup
&t=36s Pourquoi le 4-2-3-1 est la formation la plus utilisée dans le football moderne | 4231 Tactiques exp
liquées | Guardiola and Klopp both used the 4 3 3 respectively for Barcelona and Liverpool because it's considered as one of the most stable and best defensive formation. PSG, Man City, Liverpool and Barcelona also prooved that this formation could be very lethal. Goalkepper need to participate to the build up and be able to pick a pass when under the pressure of the opposition. The centerbacks must also be excellent ball players able to move the ball up to the miedfield or pick a piass in this miedfield. They will also need to play long balls for the wingers or strikers in front if the opposite defense is not set up properly. The fullbacks will support both attack and defense throughout the whole match. When it comes to the miedfield, it can vary with a flat form, a triangle with 2 defensive miedfielders and 1 offensive miedfielder or 1 defensive miedfielder and 2 offensive miedfielders. All the 3 miedfielders need to have excellent passing precision to pick players between the lines. They need to support the defense between the build up and pick out the forwards during the attack. The cdm shield the back line 4. The controller is seen often as a box to box miedfielder. He sets the tempo of the game. The creator finally link up the miedfield with the forwards above him creating the most chances of the team. Finally in front the wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They need to have egreat understanding with the striker but also the fullbacks either cutting inside to give space to the fullback either staying wide and allowing for the overlap. The striker can either be a 9 and act often like a target man to score or pass to the wingers or miedfielders. Either it can be a false 9 like in the case of Messi in Barcelona. Something to keep in mind is interchangability. 1. For this formation to work, it requires teamates constantly cover other teamates runs. For example if the fullback pushes up the cdm can shift outwide to cover any defensive hole. If the winger move inside, the center attacking miedfielder can move out to the wing to stretch the opposition. Constant moves and position changes are what make this formation effective. This formation tends also to create more passing lane directly in the central area of the field. If 2 strikers are pressing the 2 centrebacks, either the cdm can drop between them, either a fullback sit further back to beat the press. Either the goalkepper can be used as a centreback even if it's more risky. The winger can drop deep and drag a defender to free space for a miedfielder to come in. It allows the 9 to play deeper for either the other miedfield either for the other winger cutting inside.
Tactics
Explained | Strengths & Weaknesses You probably know that 4 2 3 1 formations are the most popular and comon formations in football. Teams like Man United, Bayern Munich, PSG, AC Milan, Man City often used it. The 2 centerbacks must be good ball playing centerbacks with them building up since the backline. The perfect combo would be a center back able to play quick short passes and an another center back able to play long balls to the offensive players. The fullbacks are crucial and need to have good endurance because they will constantly support attack and defense. They could depending of the
tactic
used be turned into a inverted fullback. They often move along the center meidfielders to stop dangerous counterattacks. Davies and Pavard for Bayern Munich in the 2020 and 2021 years had been exceptionnal in this role for example. Miedfield has 2 defensive miedfielders and 3 offensive miedfielders. The 2 defensive miedfielders must prevent the opposition from reaching the defensive line. They also must move the ball between the lines Goretka and Kimmich were good examples of that. Often, one of the 2 center defensive miedfielders act as a link between the defense and the miedfield or attack and the other is used as a box to box miedfielder. The 3 advanced miedfielders are often the best technically. The 2 wide attacking miedfielders has to be good on 1 v 1 situations. The central attacking meidfielder act as a 10 and must have fantastic precision and must spot any weakness in the oppositio'ns defensive line. The solde striker need to be imposing and able to redirect the balls for the runners of each side. He must help his team maintaining possession when needed and have a good link witht the central advanced miedfielder. The main advantage when attacking is the cover on the pitch with relativly short distances between the players. 1. 2 players will always be outwide, the attacking wide miedfielder and the fullback. The central attacking miedfield can go out wide to provide help. It allow the wide attacking miedfielder to drift inside for the fullback to push hig on the pitch. It's also efficient for the built up since you will see one defensive miedfielder coming between the centerbacks to have the ball. With the fullbacks pushing alongside the other defnesive miedfielder, the formation can turn into a 3 3 3 1. If pressed, the deepest defensive miedfielder must create passing lines and move the ball forward on the pitch to form a 4 diamond with the centerback, the fullback and the other center defensive miedfielder. 2. You probably know that 4 2 3 1 formations are the most popular and comon formations in football. Teams like Man United, Bayern Munich, PSG, AC Milan, Man City often used it. The 2 centerbacks must be good ball playing centerbacks with them building up since the backline. The perfect combo would be a center back able to play quick short passes and an another center back able to play long balls to the offensive players. The fullbacks are crucial and need to have good endurance because they will constantly support attack and defense. They could depending of the
tactic
used be turned into a inverted fullback. They often move along the center meidfielders to stop dangerous counterattacks. Davies and Pavard for Bayern Munich in the 2020 and 2021 years had been exceptionnal in this role for example. Miedfield has 2 defensive miedfielders and 3 offensive miedfielders. The 2 defensive miedfielders must prevent the opposition from reaching the defensive line. They also must move the ball between the lines Goretka and Kimmich were good examples of that. Often, one of the 2 center defensive miedfielders act as a link between the defense and the miedfield or attack and the other is used as a box to box miedfielder. The 3 advanced miedfielders are often the best technically. The 2 wide attacking miedfielders has to be good on 1 v 1 situations. The central attacking meidfielder act as a 10 and must have fantastic precision and must spot any weakness in the oppositio'ns defensive line. The solde striker need to be imposing and able to redirect the balls for the runners of each side. He must help his team maintaining possession when needed and have a good link witht the central advanced miedfielder. The main advantage when attacking is the cover on the pitch with relativly short distances between the players. 3. 2 players will always be outwide, the attacking wide miedfielder and the fullback. The central attacking miedfield can go out wide to provide help. It allow the wide attacking miedfielder to drift inside for the fullback to push hig on the pitch. It's also efficient for the built up since you will see one defensive miedfielder coming between the centerbacks to have the ball. With the fullbacks pushing alongside the other defnesive miedfielder, the formation can turn into a 3 3 3 1. If pressed, the deepest defensive miedfielder must create passing lines and move the ball forward on the pitch to form a 4 diamond with the centerback, the fullback and the other center defensive miedfielder. 4. The stricker can go between the defensive and miedfield line to give the ball to the wide attacking miedfielders. If the fullbacks push high, the wide attacking miedfielders drift inside. But if the winger stay high the fullback can go more inside as a support behind or make runs in front of the goal. That could turn the formation into a 2 4 4 with thefullbacks going along the defensive miedfielders and the 10 going along the 10 centrally
During the Liverpool vs Arsenal ending in 3 1 for Arsenal, Havertz and Odegaard looked to press Konaté and Van Dijk man to man. Mc ALlistair acting as single pivot. But with Jorginho closing him down and Saka tucking in, they would close down Liverpool's progression. But Gravenberch and Jones were free so Rice and Jorginho looked to cover them, allowing a free pass for Mc Allistair. Gomez was happy to invert at times to help Mc Allistair in case. However Arsenal was much more agressive and Gomez acted as a press target for Arsenal. So Rice would press Gomez knowing that Gomez wouldn't not be technically good enough to turn and find Gravenberch or Jones. So as the game progressed, Gomez stayed more as a traditionnal winger, inverting much less. Jones being a double pivot now being he was less a press target than Gomez as he was a miedfield so better at this. Trent was playing more as traditionnal fullbakc rather than inverting, allowing Gakpo and Jota operating more centrall as Klopp wanted to overload that centrel positions. It meant that the centrebacks could not press that much as it would leave gap for a long pass behind them especially with Liverpool's players rotating, making them unpredictable. As a result, the back 4 tucked into a extremly narrow defensive line with Saka and Martinelli backing up defending quite narrow at times. But as Trent was looking to make his move out wide to receive, it would force Arsenal's defense backward to not allow him to attack the box and cross. 10. Liverpool took risks since with that shape it only left 2 centrebacks back so if Arsenal gained the ball back Martinelli would set into the spaces vacated by Trent and Arsenal would hit on these spaces. As the game progressed, Zinchenko acted less as a double pivot but more as a traditionnal fullback as Jorginho and Rice were forming the double pivot. With Trent pushing up, Arteta knew that Liverpool would form a lot of times a traditionnal back 4. With Zinchenko operating wide, Havertz would join the miedfield box instead. Martinelli as a result would come more centrally at times.
&t=148s Tactical Analysis : France 2 - 1 England | England Unlucky To Lose? | YouTube Football Made Simple Tactical Analysis : France 2 - 1 England | England Unlucky To Lose? | When England had the ball, France operated in a loopsided 4 4 2 with Mbappé operaring on the left handside even ahead of Giroud sometimes who stayed deep on Rice when needed. Rabiot would tuck in left hand side position with Griezmann dropping deeper into the miedfield. This could vary into a more agressive press with Giroud coming into Maguire with Griezmann pressing Rice instead The miedfield 4 was quite narrow and tucked in with Rabiot being the widest left and Dembelé the widest right. England always built with a minimum of a back 3 with Walker tucking on often in the right side. It gave to England some security against Mbappé as Walker could often keep up with his pace on transitions. England had hard time to penetrate right throught the center of the pitch. But they were looking using the wide areas into their advantage. On the left, England's build up was flexible. it could look to a 3 2 5 with Bellingham pushing into the left half space. And if Shaw stayed deeper, Henderson would push on the right. ALternativly, Bellingham could stay deep alongside Rice with Foden moving inside, allowing Shaw to push higher down the left hand side. We saw England had more sucess with Shaw starting deeper as Dembelé to pick him during these situations. Foden stayed quite wide and Koundé remained touch tight on him for the most part. So FOden would often drop deep to give Shaw a passing option. It would draw Koundé out of his position for Bellingham to go into this space created. But Tchoaméni as the deepest miedfieldre, was quite disciplined at tracking these runs. Another advantage is that it would force France to come across the pitch in order to compensage, especially if Kane tucked in the England's left as well. 11. Rabiot would be often dragged across in order to compensage, meaning that Hernandez would have to tuck into the pitch as well. This was made worse by the fact that Mbappé tended to stay up on the pitch rather than tracking back. That allowed England to often switch from the left to the right to Saka was found himself in 1 v 1 situations against Hernandez. In this situation, Henderson would often bring support Saka either by underlapping either by overlappin. Bellingham could also makes runs from across the pitch, looking to provide an option. England's default shape is that their miedfield was mainly man to man. So England often worked the ball to Saka to be against Hernandez. As the game went on, Rabiot being in the half central miedfield half winger position and Mbappé staying back and not really tracking back, Henderson began to identify the right side of Englans as the zone with the most spaces. So he tended to shift into this region, often helped by Kane who was willing to drop in front France's defenders into the miedfield, making it more difficult for Rabiot to immediatly commit to Henderson. This would allow Saka and Henderson to have a 2 v 1 situation against Hernandez. But when Kane stayed high on the pitch, Saka could move into more inside positions and provide an option into the miedfield. With France sitting fairly deep, England struggled to create chances. When France was on possession, Griezmann and Rabiot tended to push much higher than Tchouaméni, being the single pivot. 12. The way Southgate initially used his wingers when defending put England at risk. Initially, Englandtaked Kane to press one of the centerbacks while France stayed deep. And Saka would have to come out from the wide to press the other centerback. But that means having your fullback, Walker, having potential 1 v 1 against Mbappé. But adding Hernandez who is one of the best attacking fullback in the world, in 2 v 1 is even more risky. So it was not the best chooice by Southgate and they were lucky enough to not be punished. So Southgate changed that and Saka was often seeing tracking Hernandez Instead when it was the moment to apply pressure, Henderson was taked to push high and force France back. As Foden picked on Koundé on the right, Dembelé, instead of being high where he could be easily be picked up by Shaw, dropped a little deeper, while Griezmann would push into these half spaces. This caused problems for England since if Shaw close down Griezmann, this would give Dembelé the momentum on his right wing when he drove up the pitch. That would force Maguire to play out of position. As Kane couldn't press both cb in the same time, Varane and Upamecano were instructed to move high up on the pitch, one of them by time, to create passing lines. Southgate adapted to this by having Foden watching for Dembelé more and allowing Shaw to track Griezmann in better conditions.
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:14:19 :
T'as pas l'impression que c'est la même chose?Que c'est l'extrème gauche qui est en train de faire renaitre le nazisme?
Ce n'est pas une une question de nazisme ou de je ne sais quel autre anathème lancé pour discréditer l'opposition. La question est de savoir pourquoi est ce qu'on a affaire à un parti unique en France ( LREM + PS + LR ) ainsi que son aile gauche ( LFI ) et son aile droite ( RN ).
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:12:35 :
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:12:12 :
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:11:39 :
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:11:02 :
Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:10:26 :
> Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:09:49 :
>> Le 15 novembre 2024 à 00:08:56 :
> >Pour ma part je ne suis ni QLF ni facho, je suis d'origine russe et je déteste *S*A*L
>
> T'es peut-être facho non ?
Je n'ai aucune haine envers une ethnie en particulier
La russie commet un génocide en Ukraine !
Qui te dit que je suis pro-putin ? Mais je ne suis pas pro ukraine non plus.
D'ailleurs, les deux gouvernements sont dirigés par... voilà.Par qui ?
Par Zelensky et Poutine.Officiellement, oui, mais en réalité, non
Don't revelate. Ils sont not ready.