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How Spalletti's Tactics Have Turned Napoli Into Monsters | Napoli Tactical Analysis 2022/23 |

Napoli won Serie A in 2022 2023 season. Spalletti has a typical starting XI often lining up in 4 3 3. But Elmas, Ndombele, Simeone, and Raspadoni as subs should be not underestimated. Napoli averaged an almost 60% possession during this season. They look to build with short passes but against a avery agressive pressing team, Osimhen can act as a target men for long passes. Osemhen has enough speed and physicality to either run behind the defenders either running down the channels. Either opposition press high and Napoli play over them, either sit deep and they will be more than happy to beat them on the ground. Lobotka is mostly the deepest pivot with the responsability to begin the play if the opposition is agressive Anguissa tend to be the man who can drop deeper along the central pivot Zielinski is then the most offensive miedfielder. But during emergency situations, he is capable to drop deep as well. Napoli can use opposition's press to open spaces. Rui and Di Lorenzo, the fullbacks, both have the ability to either begin deep to be outlet options, or push high up to provide the width. But Mario Rui is often the deepest of the 2, forming a pseudo back 3 and drawing in the opposition's wingers. Kvara could stay high, menacing opposition's defense. But he could as well receive the ball deep. and draw the fullback higher. Then the dynamism of Napoli's miedfield come into the play as they can now run into the spaces vacated to get the ball into wider regions. If a centerback came across to cover then Osimehn would be 1 v 1 against the remaining centerback and then he would use his pace and physicality to cause problems. Min Jae and Rrahmani had a key role with Min Jae standing out with his ability to whistand press and break the lines when it's required. If all the miedfielder's options are occupied, he can then he can move and carry the ball high up the pitch forcing the opposition to confront him and opening up more opportunities. The miedfield can be a dedicated 2 1 form where Zielinski is the most attacking of the 3. But Spalletti prefered them to be a 1 2 as it exploit better Anguissa's box to box ability. Labotka as the deepest men can be reliant on to retain possession,being enough press resistant to receive the ball in tigh regions. Even thought he has the ability to spread long balls, he tended to play short, allowing Napoli to maintain possession. The 3 others are more adventurous and Anguissa's ability ball to feet means that he can pick the ball in deeper regions then try to make his team going higher. He too can receive in these tight spaces and look to create for others. But for creativity, Zielinski is the one charged with most of that task with the most progressive passes and progressive passes received in his team. He likes to drive throught the defense and then try a bit riskier passes compared to the rest of the miedfield. He also doesn't hesitate to have a long shoot. But the sides are still the keys for Napoli in this season with Kvara holding the right side and Politano or Lozano holding the left side. Both Anguissa and Zielinski shift wide to help their wingers, forming triangles with their fullbacks, often creating overloads. They can also make runs into the half spaces to disrupt to opposition's shape. These interactions are particularly important in the right handside with the attacking Di Lorenzo quickly joining. At times we see Lozano or Politano drifting, allowing the fullback even more out wide and trying to create a central overload. Osihmen is also a threat into the center. His incredible blindside movement and his excellent jump mean that he is a constant aerial threat. He scored more headed goals than anyone in Serie A. Kvara is on the left side unpredictable and his dribbles were effective not only thanks to his technical ability but also because they didn't know what would be their final goal. Cut infield to have a shoot? Crossing to the backpost for Osimhen? Attacking the touchline then cross for Osimhen? If the fullback stay deep, he can make his cross but if he stays close, Zielinsky can enter into action. More importantly, Kvara could dodge the defenders to attack the box. The combinations between Kvara and Osemhen had been the most prolific in this season But Napoli is not only about attacking. They had the best defense of Serie A. They had one of the most intense press on the league. They were very effective both at immediate counterpress and at a more structural and organized press. Here Osimhen would press a centerback. Depending on which one, either Zielinski or Anguissa would join to form a 4 4 2. The wingers are pressing the fullbacks and the rest of the team coming across. Lobtoka is still the deepest miedfielder with the most defensive responsabilities. Especially with 3 miedfielders formations he is patrolling behind both Anguissa and Zielinski to provide a good defensive cover. But defending in 4 4 2 means that the 2 central miedfielders can be outnumbered. Althought both centerbacks prefer to remain passive, Kim Min Jae can jump the lines to make a proactive tackle, preparing his team for the counterattack. Into their own third, Napoli dropped into a more compact 4 3 3 shape.

Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 2-1 Manchester United | One Step Closer |

From the goal kick, City build up with 3 defenders as usual this 2022 2023 season. Ortega is the ball playing gk alongside Dias with Stones pushing high alongside Rodri to form a double pivot. Akanji and Walker were the wide centebracks options. For United Eriksen would push up alongside Rashford to press the central playrs and United overall started narrow. Sancho would look to apply pressure on Walker. United knew City tended to dominate the center. Instead of having a similar configuration, United opted for a 4 2 4 with Fred and Casemiro being the deepest mens and Rashford and Eriksen pressing the pivots. Fernandez and Sancho tended to play narrow to cover the center. Man City did respond by playing with a much wider back 3 to outnumber Man United in the wider regions. But when ball was passed to a wide centerback, a winger would come to press him and it would be a signal for the rest of the front 4 pack to shift across. It would force the wide centerback often either backward either into long passes. But City was patient and one of the cb often stopped with the ball in order to draw a man pressing the pivot, causing 2 v 1 here and then if the ball was passed to a wide centerback, dragging a winger, it would mean Eriksen pressing the cb would be higher than Rashford who would stay on the pivots. United's fullbacks were happy to take their men in 1 v 1 so instead, the wingers stayed high to pin them in deeper regions. When the wide cb is pressed, De Bruyne and Gundogan would shift out wide to relieve the pressure, which could drag on of the 2 United pivots. If a winger comes out wide, Eriksen's position mean that there was a pivot in this half space miedfield region. Stones going high or Haaland dropping deep could go into these pockets of spaces. Gundogan and De Bruyne would drag their men wider, creating spaces where Rodri or Stones could go into. City didn't create a lot of chances but Rodri and Stones importance should not be underestimated here.

&t=36s How Spain's Lamine Yamal Just DESTROYED France

France's only change compared to the quarter was bringing Dembelé instead of Griezmann. For Spain replaced Normand and Navas on the right replaced Carvajal. Notice that Maignan short passes were often on the right showing that France looked to build mostly on this side. They would then invite pressure and drag Spain's defenders on this side. Then when they can, switch rapidly. When it was done, Mbappé often foud himself against Nawas being isolated. At first it worked since Navas had a quick yellow card and France's goal came from his side. Navas didn't want to take risks and sit in front of him, not committing a lot which is understandable. A cross close to the second post and Kolo Muani scores his header. As for Germany it took longer to understand that danger might come from these zones since Cucurella is not that good in the airs while Laporte can also be beaten here. Spain still adapted in term of plays and players. Also they had Yamal. One thing France did well defensivly is that they cut all first passes to Rodri. For Spain it's very important to bring ball into the good zone and allow him to make line breaking passes. Rodri had low passes comparing to his standards. Most Rodri's passes were backward or sideway. He didn't make a pass into the final third once. So Spain had to rely more on Williams and Yamal in the wings and everytime they had 1 v 1 vs their fullbacks Koundé and Hernandez, Dembelé or a miedfielder, even Mbappé sometimes would help to defend against them. Williams and Yamal's number of dribbles were more limited. After France scored, Yamal, when he went to opposite fullback, the number 8 dropped to double on him. Then he left the right handside to align on Alvaro Morata Then Morata drop into the right, dragging Hernandez. That left him on 1 v 1 against Rabiot. Then he made his long shoot and scored. This goal not only shows his shoot quality but also how his understanding of spaces and movements are good. Just before the goal he moved into a deeper zone with Dani Olmo who can receive the ball but instead he stays here. He then goes into the right handside. Since Rabiot cut the passing line Yamal drags his attention then Olmo goes into the right handside. As France goes narrow with Olmost being central, that allows Navas to be found on the right who goes for the cross. Saliba deflects it to prevent Morata to score. But it comes back to Olmo who combine with Morata again to score the second goal. One of the reasons why Mbappé disappeared as the match went was Yamal. While Nico Williams was forcing the defenders back, being a permanent threat, Yamal dropped much deeper, almost alongside Navas. Yamal was basically tracking back to defend against Mbappé. You can notice that the successfull crosses from France came from their left side when they crossed into Cucurella's zone. But they also did did most of their crosses from the right side, where Dembelé was. When Giroud came on, it would be expected for Spain to fedend against a lot of crosses. But they had only 2 crosses inthe last 10 minutes.

How Spain Outclassed France

Spain showed greater strenght than France during possession phases while France struggled to show same consistency. Spain kept their 4 3 3 structure and they wanted to advance in these pockets of space either side of the opposition. It's mostly because of the positions of the fullbacks that they managed to find these spaces. The fullbacks often start deep during the first phase so if the opposition want to press them more agressivly then they have these channels available. Since oppositions know how they play now they stay deeper. They still managed to move the ball into the center because of excellent rotations between Rodri, Ruiz and Olmo. Even if Olmo started on the right handside it's not rare to see him going more on Ruiz side even taking positions out wide on the left. If Cucurella drift a bit more centrally Rodri was not afraid of adding numbers between the lines. They tried to force France to compact their shape on this side of the pitch. With players creating overloads in some specifical areas they were comfortable of retaining possession and circulate the ball. Sometimes Morata was receiving the ball with Olmo in a more central position, Ruiz and Rodri adding support, Olmo having the ball and looking for Williams out wide against Koundé. Sometimes It was Cucurella pushing up between the lines with Ruiz in a more defensive role to cover behind him. Of course if frees more spaces on the opposite flank. Why these switches are so dangerous is because Lamine Yamal would often receive the ball and then Navas would enter in action, often overlapping on the flank. This meant that Theo Hernandez was often in 2 v 1 resulting in Rabiot being more defensive to help him. Then Spain would commit a lot of numbers to attack the back post. To attack the final third, the overlaps showe dto be important because both wingers had support when they received the ball. So France faced 3 different situations. If they wanted to compact their shape there ware spaces out wide but if they wanted to cover every overloads, then Spain had more spaces in the center to drift inside and create opportunities. That being said when France won the ball back they had a lot of spaces to exploit especially in the opposite flank, mostly on their left side where Hernandez and Mbappé were. These counter attacks allowed France to create chances in the first half and even sometimes in the second half with the introduction of Griezmann and Barcola who would often try to break the press and feed Mbappé. While France started in 4 2 3 1 or 4 3 3 their defensive structure looked more like a 3 4 3 with Tchouaméni dropping between the centerbacks and the fullbacks adopting a slightly more agressive approach out wide. It's how France created their first goal with Koundé pushing high, Dembelé picking the ball in a deeper position and Rabiot on this flank trying to create a slight overload. It forced Spain to ba a more narrow and when the switch happened Mbappé was 1 v 1 against Navas and Hernandez forces the defense to not focus only on Mbappé. Then Mbappé cross and Kolo Muani scores after beating Laporte in the airs. These rotations outwide could be dangerous for Spain with Dembelé, Kolo Muani, Koundé and Kanté creating a lot of overloads on their right channel. This became less frequent as the match went on especially because Koundé adopted a more passive position. Then if Dembelé wanted to go more centrally, Cucurella would follow him with no one providing the width for France. So Dembelé had to stay close of the touchline. France ended with a lot of players at the back. Koundé became a bit slow to add support to Dembelé, meaning that Dembelé ended up being isolated in that right flank. On France's left, Hernandez would be on the othe rhand quickly to overlap and with his support Mbappé could have more 1 v 1 against Navas to exploit or pass it to Hernandez who would try to make it into the box. But at the end of the day, Spain had more positionnal rotations in their attacks than France. France could not create as different occasions as Spain. Their positionning and their moves were not as fluids.

Why Spain Have The PERFECT System To Win The Euros

How they use Williams and Yamal is what set Spain apart from others teams we saw last years. Also how they use Ruiz and Pedri. Before Spanish teams would accumulate passes would try to retain possession. But this team want to move the ball freely, quickly and vertically on the pitch to hit you where it hurts. Spanish's miedfielders are also very active, not only in the last third but also recuperating the ball in all these regions. They are active on the whole width on the pitch. For example when you see Pedri's heat map he was less involved than Fabian Ruiz defensivly but there is still this horizontal movements constant from right to left. Firstly they try to find the spaces themselves to pick the ball and try to set things. Secondly they are able to drift out of their natural side. They can pull all the defenders away to free and leave the wide attackers in 1 v 1 situations where they are thriving. They are circulating the ball in small triangles to move it directly for someone forward after. But sometimes the wingers are not even trying to ifnd numerical advantage situations. They believe in their capacity to beat their defender. Spain likes to run. In WC 2022 they averaged 75% possession. Now this stat has fallen to 56%. But the attempts increased from 15 to 27. They are the leading team of the tournament at trying to pass the opponent. For progressive carries, Spain is also the first team of the tournament as well as chances from take on. We could also see that Spain is determinate to stretch their opponents. Also Spain before used to not care too much about the defensive aspect of their game as they were always having massive possession. But as their possession dropped they had to care more about what opposition could do with the ball. Before the quarter finals in term of ground duel won %, Spain are only barely in top 20. But in the same time they are first when it comes down to ball recoveries as they have 228 and 209 for Portugal. Rythm, determination and direct runs they use in attack are their best defensive weapon. They are also maybe the best high pressing team in the whole tournament. They also have the highest turnover won with 20 for only 11 for the seconds being Austria and France. Spain also has 7 counter attack shoot, being first alongside Netherlands. Germany has 6. There are a lot of runs from the 2 central miedfielders and all the turnovers between attacking players are tiring style for the legs. When it comes down to the minutes played per player in this euro, not only Spain rested almost their entire squad but also they are very comfortable at making entering players from the bench. When it comesto Rodri he was often an option in the center of the pitch, he was in front of the opposite defenders, covered the channels vacated helped to progress the ball when they were on possession What makes Rodri so important is not only the number of passes or his capability to retain possession but it's mostly his vision and his passing range. Also Rodri being the single pivot mean that he is a magnet for the opposition to press into. Because Rodri is so good when he gets into these central deep positions, with players in front of him moving horizontally, he knows that he doesn't need to pass where Pedri is but where Pedri will be.

&t=269s Why Switzerland's Tactics Are So Dangerous

Switzerland is making constant rotatinos from deep areas allowing them then to take control of the pitch rapidly. Using Sommer as an extra defender allows the wide centerbacks being ROdriguez and Shar to spread wide outwide during the first phases of build up. This deep line frees the wingbacks to pick diferent positions. In the right the position of Ndoye is a bit more traditionnal as he is mostly hugging the touchline and looking to attack more frequently while giving width to their attacks. Aerisher as the left wingback is in the other hand taking diferent positions. He moves centrally a lot more frenquently than traditionnal wingbacks. It creates a good trio with him, Xhaka and Freuler in the center of the pitch. Unless opposition press very agressivly, Xhaka is often used as single pivot in the center. The front 3 is not trying to necessary hug the touchline on their respective side or spread wide. Instead they stay close to each other especially during build up, meaning that if they have a quick ball forward, they already created an overload in the center of the pitch.

Why Spain v Germany was a Thriller

When Spain had build up an important thing was Kimmch's position. He was very agressive and pushing up on Cucurella meaning Sané would occupy a more central position on Fabian Ruiz. Most of Spanish players in the center were covered, meaning that only channels available for Spain to build from the back were outwide. That's why we often saw Simon also doing long balls into Morata. Sometimes it worked since with Morata's hold up play with Williams, Rudiger and Tah were shifted toward the same side. You saw often Williams trying to pick the ball out wide and playing throught the lines changing play often to Yamal who was the other winger on the other side. Germany realized they couldn't press too agressivly because Germany would see the ball being passed behind them. When Kimmich came back to mark Williams, it meant Sané would have to close down Cucurella. But then Spain would be very comfortable playing in the half spaces. A lot of times Williams trief to link up play with Morata. A lot of times Cucurella would catch the opposition off guard when he made the runs here and then Williams would try to attack the spaces out wide from behind. Sometimes It would even be Morata shifting in this position with Fabian Ruiz covering and trying to disrupt Germany's defensive line. For Spain a lot of their chances came from the left inside channel with combinations between Williams, Morata and Cucurella but also a lot of chances came because Spain was very agressive and effective in their counter press structure. Germany's miedfielders got closed down very quickly. As for Germany their 4 2 3 1 became as usual a 3 3 1 3 shape. The back 3 consisting of Rudiger, Tah and Kross allow their fullbacks to push very high In first half it was difficult for them to take advantage of numerical advantage in the center but as the game progressed these overloads became more crucial. Also this back 3 left Spain with a dilemma, either pressing man to man but letting a lot of spaces to the fullbacks out wide, either dropping their backline more and not be overloaded here. But then they allow not only Germany to be in control but also dominate in the opposition's half. At the beginning of second half Spain got their first goal and it came from Morata being able to pass to Yamal who would then take on his men and pass to Olmo who made a very clever run on the edge of the box and finish it. When players entering in the game we saw some tactical changes and structural ones. Havertz was playing for example more like an attacking miedfielder after Gundogan was replaced by Fullkrug. Also the introduction of Fullkrug meant that Germany wanted to cross into the box more frequently. As Germany gained control of the game these delivering into the box were even more dangerous. Spain subbed out Yamal for Ferran Torres, Morata subbed off for Merino, a miedfielder while Oyarzabal replaced Nico Williams. Germany subbed out Tah for Muller, who was a much more offensive player obviously. Now Andrich was acting as an extra centerback alongside Rudiger. Outside Oyarzabal and Merino, Spain was deep in central position at the end of the second half. Germany tried to stretch Spain and even if Germany got slowed down, Spain didn't hold until the end. The qualizerd came from a cross and then Kimmich head the ball to Wirtz who score. In extra time Spain's structure was less attacking. Olmo went on the left flank instead of Ruiz meaning that Merino could adopt a more natural position as a miedfielder and Spain had a more coherent attack. It's what got Spain the winning goal late in the extra time with Olmo crossing and Merino heading the ball to Germany's goal in the top bin.

How Mourinho Conquered La Liga | Jose 2011/12 Real Madrid Tactics | Peak Mourinho |

This season is one of the biggest in history of liga with Real Madrid winning la Liga with 100 points. They scored 121 goals, a record still standing. Their goal difference is 89. They also have 50 points away from home still unbeaten. They often would choose a 4 3 3 with Alonso as deep lying playmaker, and the other defensive miedfielder Lassana Diarra, who made Real Madrid hard to penetrate throught the center. He was mainly used in the games against tough oppositions in knock out games. Ozil came in place of Diarra, making them more offensive. Their formation was often a 4 2 3 1. Real Madrid had an average of 57% of possession. They mainly played short to one of the 2 centerbacks. But against a team who pressed high, they were comfortable of going long as they had 2 aerial targets, being Ronaldo and either Higuain or Benzema. As one man made the header, the other would run behind often joined by Di Maria with Ozil just behind them. They searched to provoke an attack. Both centerbacks were comfortable on the ball. However, Ramos was the best here. If all passes on the miedfield were cut off, he could take the responsability to conduct the ball on the pitch with Pepe covering. Even when these 2 remained deep, Pepe would generally be the deepest to allow Ramos to be slightly higher. Alvaro Arbeloa was the right back, who was more an outlet to relieve pressure when necessary. For the most part he stayed deep, slightly in advanced compared to the centerbacks when it was possible. Marcelo on the left was vital for the attacks. He dribbled alongside the line when needed. He also made more risky passes to break the lines as well as trying diagonal passes to Di Maria who would maintain the width on the right. Even without the ball, he moved higher on the pitch than the right back. When it comes to facing tohugher teams, Khedira who usually was often acting as an extra player in the box, often making overlaps when the right back stayed deep, was more disciplined. In this case Alonso would be a bit higher to thread long balls to the front 3. A double pivot allowed the front 4 to have more freedom with Ozil often staying centrally and spreading balls to the 3 others of the front line. But he also liked to move more wide to help the winger, often creating overloads. In this case he would often either gain time on the ball, either make a precise pass forward. Di Maria was often hugging the touchline. The rare times the right back was overlapping however, he would have the freedom to tuck inside and look for a key pass. In fact he was second in his team in term of key passes this season, only behind Ozil. He also had good long shoot qualities. However the key man was still Ronaldo. He would rarely attack the wide. Instead he would let Marcelo doing the overlap and position himself into the half spaces. Ronaldo had the most long shoots among all players from la Liga by a large margin, scoring 7 goals from outside the box. This meant that others teams had to tigh their shapes to stop him, often even double teaming against him. This freed more spaces for Ozil in the center and if the entire opposition shifted to the left side, Di Maria was often the free man to receive for a quick switch to the otehr side of the pitch. When Ronaldo left his position, Ozil often came here to look to cross into the dangerous regions into the box. But Ozil would also link up to Marcelo, passing the ball to him, so he could look to provide to Ronaldo or have a regular cross. Real Madrid attempted 22 crosses per game on average during this season. Benzema and Higuain were both hard working. Both were selfless and worked for the team, dropping to link up when necessary or even when Ronaldo needed more spaces in central areas. Both were good at scoring from crosses. Also or creating spaces for themselves at the edge of the box. Against a weaker opposition, after loosing the ball, Madrid pressed high to win it high on the pitch when it was possible. But when they were easy bypassed, they tended to drop deeper. Madrid's priority was to protect the center of the pitch. Di Maria was a defensive winger, contrasting to Ronaldo who would stay higher up on the pitch pratically as a forward while Ozil being slightly deeper meant that their formation looked like sometimes as a lop sided 4 3 1 2 with an emphasis of closing down the center as they had 2 dominant centerbacks who could deal with crosses. Both Khedira and Alonso tried to have the most of tackles and interceptions in the second defensive line in the center. During counter attacks, both Ramos and Alonso were capable of doing long and precise balls. Often Ozil would drift behind the defensive miedfielders into the space, with Ronaldo and the other forward running in behind, freeing space for Ozil while Di Maria would also join the attack. Often in this situation the opposition's fullback is high to take advantage of Ronaldo staying high and Di Maria tucking in. When Ozil was conducting the ball, the forwards were trying to make intelligent runs and Di Maria would often passing the ball for them to finish off the move.

Why Ange Postecoglou is the Next Big Thing in Football?

With no traditionnal fullbacks in the structure, by using diamonds and triangular patterns, he has turned spurs into a vertical tiki taka team which is capable of breaking any opposition's defense. He uses a 4 3 3 formation but during possession, it transforms into a 2 3 5 structure. Where Pep and Arteta uses an inverted fullback, Postecoglou uses 2 inverted fullbacks which is quite unique. During the build up phase, they have 2 1 2 structure where the fullbacks moves into the center and the cdm drops deeper to form a link between the centerbacks and the central fullbacks. It facilitates circulation against high pressing teams with quick short passes. As the game progress into the second phase, one of the central miedfielder drop deeper into the flanks while the striker, the winger and the other number 8 drift wide, creating a double diamond inside of the pitch. It creates numerical diagonal and vertical passing options into the final third allowing fluid transitions from defense to attack and encouraging vertical playing style. In addition to olverload the wide areas, it also gives a significant overload in the center with the fullbacks moving into the center. This way the team can create a miedfield powerhose with 5 v 3 which can let multiple players unmarked proovking more passing options and helping to move the ball more with more efficiency. When the opposition add more players centrally, Spurs can quickly switch to a double diamond to exploit the wide areas. This traps the oppositions from all sides. In the final third, they maintain the 2 3 5 structure but add more flexibility and positional rotations. For example if the opposition is too rigid, 2 wingers could move a bit more inside, leaving the way for the fullbacks to push forward. Alternativly, the wingers can also stretch the opposition by staying as wide as possible which can leave gaps into the half spaces to run in which is often executed by the inverted fullbacks or the number 8, meaning that 7 players are involved into the attack. These players have the freedom to move into the spaces and change their positions, confusing the defensive line, resulting in goalscoring ipportunities. Without the ball, the team gives priority to recuperate the ball in high positions on the pitch. One of the problems of the tactic is that when the 2 fullbacks are inverting, it let wide spaces for the opposition to launc a quick counter attack. To solve the problem, the center defensive miedfielder drop deep to form a back 3 with the centerbacks. This strategy is efficient but no without risk. The structure need rapid adaptations to maintian solidity in defense. Firstly the striker act like a deep lying forward and interchanging positions with wingers and the 8, looking to create or run into the spaces into the opposite's defense while the winger stay wide but can also invert. Because of the absence of fullbacks, the wingers are positionned as wide as possible. But there are moments whe the wingers can adopt a narrower position allowing the 2 fullbacks to overlap. It makes difficult for opponent to predict their movements. In the middle, Maddison and Sarr use perfectly their roaming playmaker roles, moving constantly out of their positions to find spaces, whatever by making runs into the half spaces, or drifting wide into the pitch to create this double diamond structure. They also have the freedom to drop deeper if needed, acting like outlet options to build the game from deep. Bissouma, the cdm, act like a miw between a deep lying playmaker and a defensive destroyer. His excellent ball control and his passing abilities allow him to dictate the tempo of the game. Acting as a pivot connecting defensive and offensive units. Udogie and Porro are the inverted fullbacks. They must give the 2 number 8 more freedom to occupy the positions into the half spaces and contribute more to the attack. Alsotheir positionning create a double pivot in central zones. These compacts presences make difficult for the opposition to execute central penetrative passes while the 2 centerbacks must be excellent ball playing defenders. It's necessary against high press from the opposition. Their ability to read the game with precision and make passes allow the team to bypass the opposition's first line of press effectivly. Finally the goalkepper assume the role of sweeper. He is tasked of attracting opposition's closing presser by holding the ball and opening up spaces so the others can be free. The tempo is fast while the defensive line is set up high. The team is encouraged to recover the ball quickly and start a counter attack. In the final third, they often look for the overlap option. It encourages fullbacks and/or number 8 to make runs to open up spaces. The passing style and the goalkepper distribution are often shorts. It's typical to tiki taka style. Against Man United, Spurs reduced the opposition in the center by having their inverted fullbacks. This strategy created enough spaces for the flanks to go throught and forcing the opposition to stretch themselves, opening up gaps in the half space for the inverted fullback to go in and score the goal. The high line and the inverted fullbacks allowed Spurs to win the ball back higher on the pitch. This strategy let the opponent's defense exposed. United defended with 5 mens and a pivot. So to attack that the 2 inverted fullbacks advanced to form a 6 v 6 situation. To disrupt the structure, the fullback drift toward the winger to attract the marker from the fullback and creating a gap in the defensive line.

Pourquoi la Nouvelle Tactique du Portugal est si Agressive!

Portugal was a team that used to rely on individual brillance while playing in a pragmatic way. Now they are showcasing one of the best team cohesion. With the creativity of Cancelo, Viitnha and Leao on the left, Dalot, Bruno and Silva on the right with the finition of Ronaldo or Jota in the center, they are creating occasions from every part of the pitch. With positionnal rotations and a typical back 3 with 2 cb and a cdmn, Portugal became one of the most exiting teams to watch. When Santos was Portugal's manager they used to play in 4 4 2 or 4 3 3 formation. However instead of usual 4 3 3 they prioritized the defensive responsabilities to limit opposition's attackers. It often meant that they had to rely on individual brillance of Ronaldo or others to win and use either counter attacks either set pieces. Despite them winning the euro 2016 and 2019 Nations League, they didn't fully capitalize on their offensive capiabilities. But after the arrival of Roberto Martinez, Portugal went from a reactive 4 3 3 style to a more flexible that can turn into a 3 2 5 or 3 4 3 depending on the phases in the game. It balanced the defensive solidity with the attacking potential. Contrary to the rigid tactics of Santos, Martinez encourage players to make rotations, create overloads to make themselves difficult to predict and counter. During Santos's era when they were pressed they often started their build up in the wings or played long balls to the center. The centerbacks struggled to get the ball to the miedfielders. So to solve the issue, Martinez introduced the false cdm. Instead of using a 4 + 1 shape, he made his csm dropping between the centerbacks to form a diamong shape with the gk. It allowed the fullbacks to push up while the center miedfielders drifted back in pivot positions. It transformed the 4 + 1 shape into a 4 + 4 shape if we include the goalkepper. It created numerical superiority against the opposition, helping to circulate the ball easily and provide multiple options in attack. This modification not only helped them at the back but also reinforced their offensive power from wide areas. Before with the 4 + 1 shape, Cancelo and Dalot who are known for their attacking qualities, coudln't fully exploit their potentials on the flanks. This restriction forced the wingers to stay wide, resulting in less players in the center and a heavy reliance on Ronaldo to score. However with a back 3, these players has become additional wingers tasked to create overloads on the wings. This allowed more numbers in central areas and it reduces the pressure on Ronaldo and the others forwards. But when they are playing against low pressing team sides, this shape can struggle to get into the other half of the pitch. As both number 8 move deep, no one if in these advanced positions to make the link with the forwards. So to solve this problems, Martinez use 2 inverted fullbacks. For example when cdm drop between the cb, both the fullbacks can form the double pivot, allowing the 2 central miedfielders to stay into advanced positions and stretch the low pressing team further vertically. Martinez apply with these moves a combination of interchanging positions and movements to diagonal to advance the ballon after the build up. For example when the ball is passed ot the right back, the left back move centrally into the pitch, allowing the center miedfielder to progress rapidly forward. To create even more spaces, the striker can drop deep close to the ball carrier to attract central miedfielders to him. This create a diagonical scheme making them progress the ball rapidly higher with less players. In the final third in order to cover the responsabilities of the att&cking fullbacks, the cdm must stay deep to form the back 3. This let the central pivot free which can be crucial to sustain counter attacks. But as a result, the central meidfielders and fullbacks must stay deep or run back, compromising their offensive play. So Martinez found an alternative solution which he oftne used for Belgium national team when he was their manager. Instead of a false cdm and wingers, he could line up a real back 3 and 2 forwards, adding a proper pivot behind the 2 central miedfielders. It creates a solid defensive support with a 3 + 1 diamond in a 3 5 2 system allowing more freedom for the central miedfielders and the fullbacks/wingbacks to advance. With the defense fully protected using this, Martinez associate both his wingbacks and his central miedfielders with the strikers to form triangles of large rotations to disrupt the opposition's marking. So Portugal has a lot of creative players capable of making the difference. However despite their creativity, these playmakers sometimes struggle to finish their occasions. For example vs Czech, they had 8 shoots on target but only 2 goals. Also in defense when playing with a back 3, Portugal still struggle against long balls during rapid transitions. Apart from Ruben Dias and Pepe, they need solid and experienced technical defenders to sustain these counter attacks. They have Icacio and Antonio Silva, both less than 23 years old, only 20 years old in Silva's case, who just started ot play for Portugal. It's one of the reasons why he introduced a false cdm because it allows experimented players like Palhinha or Neves to drop deep as a third cb. To apply the false cdm, the number 6 could play as a libero starting deep during the build up to create a numerical advantage and then advancing forward as a real central defensive miedfielder during attacks. Because of him, both fullbacks are free to push up with the left back, often Cancelo, acting like an inverted fullback. With Bernardo Silva often drifting centrally it's important to have a strong right back like Dalot who can advance and play as a wingback. Then the 2 number 8, Vitinha and Bruno have both the freedom to roam across the pitch. Their main jobs is to change positions to drag markers toward them then make quick runs into open spaces created by others or show exceptionnal creativity in their passing to make things happening. Leao on the left can use his exceptionnal dribbling and ball carrying ability to force opposition to send more players to beat his dribbles. Finally upfront, Ronaldo is set to be a target pivot. Despite his age he is still involved in combinations, making rotations of positions to create spaces for others. Also by using positions changing movements, it freed Ronaldo and others strikers with less strikers around them, resulting in more scoring opportunities. Martinez shifted the team from a balanced counter attacking side to an expressive creating attacking team as he emphasizes creating constant opportunities with rotations and overloads. In defense, Portugal shifted from a mid pressing side to a high pressing team. Into the final third, Martinez prefer using overlaps and runs into the defense as both Portugal's fullbacks have the freedom to make runs in overlaps. Portugal is becoming a team relying more and more on collective brillance rather than individual one. If they get rid of their weaknesses, they can quickly become top contenders into every tournaments they will play

The Tactical Evolution Of Cristiano Ronaldo | How Ronaldo Has Changed | Ronaldo Tactical Analysis

The first version of Ronaldo is the one we saw when he was still a teenager in Sporting Lisbonne under the manager Laszlo Boloni. He was almost exclusivly used as a pure winger on the right handside, attacking the byline and looking to cross. Had had the pace, agility and dribbling ability to impress. But he was also critized to be only about dribbles and not about scoring goals. He scored only 3 goals in 25 championship matches. During a friendly vs United, Ferguson was convinved by his talent and he made him at this time the most expensive transfer for a teenager. The plan was to loan him back but his performance was so impressive that he kept him. During the first 3 years at Man United, Ronaldo wasn't quite reaching his potential. He played at the right wing as a traditionnal winger and was good at making crosses. But he had not adapted his game and was still considered as a show pony. In 95 matches, he scored only 18 goals. After the WC 2006, he was different. He had grow up in his physicality, increased his strenght and pace, etc.... He also started to be less showboating and increased his positional freedom. The attacking trio during the 2007 - 2008 season was Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo. All 3 would interchange positions so Ronaldo was not confined in the wings. Instead he had more areas to find spaces. He made him more difficult to mark. His finishing capability also improved. During the 3 next seasons, in 101 league appearances, he scored 66 goals. An incredible improvement. During the 2006 - 2007 season, he ended with the most assists with 14 assists in the Premiere League. Finally in 2008 he got his first balon d'or at only 23 years old and e scored 31 goals during the 2007 - 2008 season. Ronaldo became in 2009 the most expensive Real Madrid's player at this time and also the most expensive of all times. At Man United, we saw a fluid attacking player by the end. In Real Madrid, he was used in a more set system, mostly a 4 2 3 1. Initially, Kaka played as cam, with Di Maria as the right winger and Higuain/Raul as the forward. So Pellegrini and Mourinho made him play in the left. He was comfortable cutting in to get shoots. Kaka and then Ozil later, would try to draw the defenders away in the center, opening a space to attack centrally with dribbles and long shoots. When the ball went wide, he would attack the box. And if It was Ronaldo who drew the defenders, it would allow him to find others teamates like Ozil who would make his incisive passes. Ronaldo usually didn't drop that much during the defensive phases compared at the United era. Real Madrid often defended in 4 2 3 1 or in lopsided 4 4 2. It allowed them to be devastating on the break and to be the best counter attacking team in the world. Ronaldo combinaed his pace with his dribbling ability. As he was more clinial in the box, his long shoots started to decline in quantity. He was proactive in his adaption. When Ozil was sold Real Madrid shifted to a traditionnal 4 3 3. As so, Ronaldo played higher and more central. Bale was maintaining the width for tha major part of the matches at the right wing, drawing defenders with his abilities ball to feet and opening more spaces for a Ronaldo who was now playing more centrally. Benzema's unselfishness meant that he would often come back in defense. The first thing Zidane changed was the number of matches in which Ronaldo was playing. Zidane rested Ronaldo when needed to make sure he was fresh for the big games. Zidane shifted often to a 4 4 2 diamond with Ronaldo and Benzema on top. With Ronaldo as a confirmed forward,Benzema tended to track back more. Ronaldo started higher on the pitch and he didn't have to pick up a lot of balls and progress it by himself. He only dropped deep for the attacking line up and then he lurks into the box for crosses. He went for beingn a pure traditionnal winger to a pure forward. This version of Ronaldo won 2 more balon d'or.

The Tactical Evolution of Lionel Messi | How Messi has changed | Messi Tactical Analysis

It's obvious that Messi in 2022 was not the same that the one that made his debuts at Barcelona 1 team at 17 years old. He runs less, dribbles less, presses less. But he still stayed very effective. During his La Masia and Barcelona B times, he was a mazy dribbler who liked to operate as a number 10 or on the left wing. When Messi arrived in A team, the attack consisted of Eto'o, Ronaldinho and Guily. His favourite positions were number 10 and left wing. It they were both taken with Ronaldinho starting at the left and drifting inside. So Frank RIkjaard, the manager at the time, played Lionel Messi at the right wing. This era went from 2004 to 2008. He was more of a dribbler who hadn't grown into his physique. He would aim to cross pass into Ronaldinho and Eto'o. He scored 7 goals in his 24 first matches. He would now dribble into the center from the right to have a shoot. From 2006 to 2008, his goalscoring instinct started to really activate with 24 goals and 16 assists. He was not anymore staying at the right wing but also drifting when he wanted. Then came Pep Guardiola. When Pep came in, he made important changes, getting rid of key players like Deco, Ronaldinho and eventually, Eto'o. Messi initially maintained his wide position when Eto's and then Ibrahimovic were up top. This soon changed when Messi became a false 9 which would cause a lot of tactical problems to oppositions. This is how and where he would play from 2008 to 2014. As a false 9 he is playing behind the opposition's defensive miedfield line and in front of the centerbacks, forcing the opposition to take a decision. If a defensive miedfielder picked him up, Iniesta could move forward and unlock the defensive line. If a centerback pushed and picked him up, there was spaces for the forwards to run into, being Pedro or Villa. And if both stayed in their positions, he would pick up the ball and dribble the defenders. It's as a false 9 that he won 4 balon d'ors on 8. During the same period he scored 212 goals and had 76 assists. The next phase is going from 2014 to the present. With Neymar and Suarez forming the MSN with Messi, Neymar would play out wide in the left to occupy defenders while having to deal with Luis Suarez up front. It would mean that Luis Enrique made Messi back to the right wing position. However unlike the right wing he was when he arrived at Barcelona in 2004, he would drift into the center frequently to score and also use his creativity to set up teamates. His creativity would flourish. In reality he was playing like in a hybrid role between a false 9 and an attacking miedfielder. Suarez would occupy the defense, freeing up spaces between the defense and the miedfield. In the same time Jordi Alba as the right back would often push up to link up with Messi and bring the width. For Barcelone he made 104 assists and scored 174 goals during this period. During this period, Messi won the 2015 balon d'or.

Why These Tactics are Dominating the

Euros One of the most comon way for teams is to use a back 3 during the build up. Despite this being already popular at club level, it can be surprising that so many nations has done it. The favourites nations tended to start in a 4 2 3 1 or a 4 3 3 and the challenging nations lining up with eithe a 3 4 3 either a 3 5 2 or 5 3 2. Germany start with a 4 2 3 1. However when building up from the back, Kross drops aside of the centerbacks on the left, allowing their fullbacks to gain a lot of width on the flanks, giving Germany a lot of attacking options. It's one of the reasons why they became a lot more favourite in this euros, as this build up structure is very difficult for opposite's fullbacks. Portugal has often their defensive miedfielder Palhinha dropping between the centerbacks, looking when possible to make a long pass to the wingers from a more protected position. Others nations like France, England and Italy who were not showing a level that good in the euros, their back 3 involved their right fullback tucking inside with the left fullback pushing much further up on the flank. The major difference then is how many players they are using as pivots in the center. A lot of nations choose 2 players. But others nations like Germany or Portugal only keep one player in this position and allow more players to push between the lines. Most comon defensive structures in the euros were 5 3 2, 4 4 2 or 5 4 1 formations. The 2 firsts had 2 strikers on the top. By switching to a back 3, you make opponent making a chooice between either having a miedfielder being out of his line to press but let more spaces behind, or accept the numerical disadvantage and force the opposition in areas out wide. 1. Switching to a back 3 can allow to free a player to pass in the miedfield. It's how teams like England has been able to control the ball. Using a wide back 3, Denmark had been able to bypass the initial press pretty easily and attract the miedfield line out of position to free spaces. One of the most impressive teams so far is obviously Spain. They scored a lot of goals while not conceding a single time during this group stage. Even out of possession they maintain their 4 3 3 structure, making sure the opposition's backline isn't given the time on the ball to make the right chooice. When the opposiiton push up into Spain's third, It can quickly switch into a 4 5 1 structure or 4 4 2 structure and block off every options in the central areas. By making this switch it's not easy for opposition to push forward and it ends up oftnen with them having one less player participating in the attacking shape. Spain is one of the few teams that is not using 3 players during the build up. Keeping their backline of 4 has caused some problems to the opposition Another thing to note from Spain is their supercharged overloads on possession. Relationnism is not as intense as Fernando Denise or some others South American managers. A big side of relationnism is big overloads in possession to create more connextions between players. Spain often use their 3 box to box miedfielders to support their winger on the ball. Germany has 4 offensive players constantly rotating and dropping deep to look for the progression. Turkey is looking to overload around the ball with the defensive miedfielder pushing up much further on the pitch when Turkey has possession. Switzerland has their left wingback often moving in more central positions when attacking on the right flank. It's made to free a player on the other side of the pitch after forcing a lot of players in this side of the pitch. (modifié) Spain has a lot of positionnal players considering the clubs where they are playing. Germany is a mix of diferent playing styles. We also see that defenses tend to be very deep, allowing more shoots from the edge of the box. Denmark's goal vs England is a good example of that.

Les tactiques gagnantes des triples de Jupp Heynckes expliquées | Analyse tactique du Bayern Munich 2012/13 |

From the back, Neuer was one of the best ball playing gk, being a third man in the build up phase if the centerbacks were being pressed, allowing them to play out more easily because of their numerical supeirority. In fact most of the teams weren't doing high press as they knew that as soon as Bayern would pass the first line of pressure, they were men short further back as the men who pressed would be on the wrong side of the ball and were basically inactive defenders. Both cb, Boateng and Dante were comfortable on the ball. On rare occasion when they were under pressure they could play long balls as they had a target men like Mnadzukic who could hold up the play. Those 2 had the most accurate long passes per match in the Bundesliga. But most of the times they went short to the miedfielders. In the first phase both Alaba and Lahm as fullbacks made themselves available for short passes. Once received they were superb on the ball, laying the ball into their pivots or their attacking miedfielder. Or playing the ball down the line to their winger. More often than most of the teams, Bayern looked to penetrate by the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez were the pivots with Schweinsteiger being sometimes more a box to box and Martinez being purely defensive. Both were excellent on the ball, helping retaining possession in tight areas. If both cb were pressed, Martinez tended to drop between the 2. With Schweinsteiger isolated, Toni Kross who was playing as an attacking miedfielder also showed that he was comfortable being in deeper regions as he would show later both for Real Madrid and Germany. But when Muller played instead of Kross, he tended to stay higher up the pitch in these phases. Schweinsteiger was the heart of the team with an average of 74 passes per game. However Bayern's major threats were in the wide regions with Robben and Ribery who were often hugging the touchline. Bayern used the middle of the pitch as a basis to attack wider regions. Schweinstiger was the player facilitating this with more than 11 long balls attempted and completing 9 on 11 on average. So their wingers could be in 1 v 1 situations and cause damages. When the ball went to Toni Kross instead, Schweinsteiger pushed higher up to create overloads in these high regions. Both weren't hesitating to strikr from range when they had the opportunity. But more comon was the presence of the 2 drawing the opposition more centrally, opening more rooms on the flanks. Kross was excellent at constently switching the play to the wingers to perpetually shift the defenders from side to side and bring their key mens to 1 v 1 with the fullback. Once the ball is wide, the winger come on life. Both were inverted, meaning that they wanted to dribble their opponent and Robben was more likely to attempt his signature cold shoot from these half space regions with 2 dribbles per game and 2,9 shoots with more than half of them coming from outside the box. Ribéry was more creative in this role. When he cut in, he could also have a shoot but also dribble the ball to the forward to finish. He was also comfortable cutting back on his weak foot to attack the byline and cross where Mandzukic who is good in the airs, could look to finish. But the wingers were consisteltly assisted by their fullbacks who were the keys to overlap. Lahm had 11 assists while Alaba had 3. Muller also changed the dynamic of his team as when he played as an attacking miedfielder, he combined with Mandzukic who often pulled ouf to the left, which created spaces for Muller who would look to finish. But his most comon role was on the right wing when Robben was injured. He rarely took on his fullback. Instead he would give it to Lahm who was supported by Kross while Muller made his way into the box. Then Mandzukic and Mullere were the perfect aerial targets while Swhweinsteiger was the box to box miedfielder moving in these areas to help flooding the box. As a result, these 3 scored the most headed goals for their team with 7 goals for Mandzukic and 4 goals for Schweinsteiger and Muller. Off the ball Keybckes used a lot of counterpress. Pressing foten started with Mandzukic harassing the centerbacks until they are forced to play long or go wide. Here the winger would press him. The defensive line tended to be higher. And their fullbacks particulary followed their men high. They made the pitch big when they had the ball but off the ball they shifted to one side to cut off options, making the pitch looking smaller when defending. Once winning the ball back there were a lot of players who could take advantage of long balls When defending for long phases, Bayern went into a 4 5 1 with the wingers dropping deep to assist the defenders. High lines helped to facilitate counter attacks. This was made possible because they had a sweeper keeper like Manuel Neuer who was capable of dominating and clearing the ball when it was played into dangerous regions near him. But in UCL, they could switch their tactics and make it a more counter attacking style when it was necessary. The paces of Robben and Ribéry meant that during turnovers, they could take advantages of the space left behind. This combined with the long passing range of the whole backline and miedfield meant that the line breaker passing could come from anywhere and then the wingers and the forward were deadly.

Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea Tactics Explained | How Tuchel's Changed Chelsea |

Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch. So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence. Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that miedfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.

Tactics Explained: Mourinho's Chelsea (2004-2006)

Mourinho's Chelsea is one of the most innovative team ever seen tactically. They got into semi final of UCL but weren't semented into the absolute top clubs of the Premiere League yet until Mourinho came. It took 2 entire seaons for the opposite teams to start knowing how to deal with this because they never seen that before. Chelsea had Cech gk, Terry and Carvalho cb, Gallas and Ferreira fullbacks, Makelele holding miedfielder, Essien and Lampard as box to box miedfielders, Robben and Duff wingers and finally Dorgba forward. Gudjohnsen could replace Drogba forward as well. To the english teams, using a holding miedfielder, Makelele in this pure 6 role, was mindblowing back then. Premiere League was obsessed with 4 4 2 back then whatever it was Man United, Arsenal. They always had 2 center miedfielders. It gave teams balance with 2 players in every single positions of the pitch outside gk. During build up, both cb separated a bit wide with both fullbacks pushing slightly further up and Makelele dropping, forming a bow with the 2 cb and the gk. Generally teams had one ball playing centerback and the other heading balls out, tackling, and all conventionnal things. Chelsea had 2 ball playing centerbacks. Both cb would be free to carry the ball higher on the pitch when opposition sit deep in their 4 4 2, to help the rest of the team to advance. But when they pressed higher theere were almost always Makelele free in the center. Chelsea had now 2 cb and 3 miedfielders so 5 players centrally. There was always a free men in the center of the miedfield. If teams choosed to defend them in 4 4 1 1 to cover all the 3 miedfielders including Makelele so, they couldn't defend both Terry and Carvalho with only one isolated forward. Even if when defending in 4 4 2, Makele was covered and a wide men was going to defend against the free miedfielder, this left a fullback free and in this Chelsea's system they made also something very innovative with fullbacks. Before Mourinho came in the Premiere League, fullbacks almost never attacked the way they are attacking nowadays. In Chelsea, fullbacks provided the width to form a front 5. Mostly Chelsea's wingers may have the job of staying close to the touchline and provide crosses, they also often inverted them in the middle of the game. It could be one fullback only going high and make the winger invert with Lampard making a late run to form a front 5. Bridge in the left was a good attacking fullback. Makelele often moved into the spaces the fullback vacated to maintain that regular structure. Chelsea often ended in ridiculous situations where they still had their back 4 with one player, being either Essien or Tiago patrolling these central spaces. Chelsea was still stable, defensive and quite boring by times. But they conceded only 15 goals in one season mostly because they dominated the ball. During the same season they scored between 70 and 75 goals. Also It was difficult to attack against this Chelsea team because Mourinho didn't play with 2 good overlapping fullbacks and 2 inverting wingers. He only played with one at time. Sometimes during a game he woudl change the side in which it's happening. Chelsea could attack either down the middle with numerical superiority, either down the flanks where they could hurt others teams in different ways. Also Cech played sometimes long balls to Drogba. Some would think that against a 4 4 2 with numerical disadvantage it's stupid but it's not. Drogba received critics during his 2 first seasons in Chelsea because he wasn't a prolific goalscorer despite his potential. But Drogba was good at bullying the defenders and creating spaces for his teamates. Theorically even with Lampard's runs, both cb could close down Drogba and Lampard. But Lampard was one of the best of the world for his late timing runs in the box. Also Drogba was capable of attracting both centerbacks often, swapping between which one is marking him.

Why England Were SO Bad Against Denmark

Just like against Serbia, England took an early lead then sit back and invite the pressure. But unlike Serbia, Denmark managed to pull down this system. At the beginning England went for long balls and commit mens forward but doesn't win the ball. Despite England's defense trying to organize somehow Denmark got a shoot at the edge of the box with no player to close him down. The team is tighten together in the middle In one hand they look like a team who want to play forward with a high line and in the other hand they look like a team that want to sit back because the attackers are so deep. England tended to move the ball really slowly like they wanted to keep possession for long but when they lost it there were no agressive attempts to keep it back. There was no intensity in that pressing. Almost no passing lanes were cut when Denmark was building up. When a Danish defender receive on the other side of the pitch, he had a lot of space. And Foden is not applying pressure. Denmark was in the other hand not always successfull at winning the ball back but at least they were trying their best to prevent England from to play in front. We could see the lack of intensity from England side during the whole match. Denmark easily passed that first line of pressure like it didn't exist. Foden being naturally more narrow player meant that Denmark had all the spaces in the world playing out wide. It forced Trippier to often break his line to stop the pass. Before Denmark's goal, Kane dropped deep to receive the ball in a wingback position and he passed it wrong in the middle of the pitch. When you play Rice and TAA as central miedfielders, it's the responsability of one of them to take the ball from the backline to make that first pass out of the defense. We know TAA want to make damage in the final third. So Rice had to do the classic number 6 role. Rice can get, give the ball move, circulate the ball, all of this. But almost all of them were not line breaking passes of passes forward. Among England's failed passes, many of them come from long and deep areas. How many times Kane had to drop deep to receive a long ball or drop on the flanks trying to link up. Also when Saka had the ball he had little to no options. He often got all the players attacking the goal but all on the same line. There is nobody at the edge of the box and no overlap and even when Walker did, he was often offside like it was the case in the first half. Southgate symbolizes a vital and major culture shift on how England team works. Of course you can't have 11 of the best players being in the 11 line up and excpect to have the magic doing the rest. Teams need a better plan, organization, discipline, mental strenght and scheme. Some people were actually mad because of Henderson, Phillips in the miedfield and Maguire in the defense being picked up despite the last one being bad for Man United. But it's how we build a national side. It's not only about having the best players on paper. It's not about picking 11 players and hope the system works or either having a really clever system and pick the 11 players who will make it work despite the talents you got available. It's about getting the balance between the 2. It's about identifying a couple of players who can work together in a particular system then you build around that. Look at the team that went into the final for England in euro 2021. The backline played really well together. But you had Rashrod, Henderson, Mount who were in the 11 despite teh fact that there were better talents behind them on the bench. That was because they made sure that it worked. Kane had one of his best seasons with Bayern but now with England when he tries to press, he looks like he is lost in sea. Foden is flopping despite him dragging Man City all the way to the Premiere League title previously. Declan Rice play the same role that he was playing with Arsenal this season but somehow it's not working. The England starting XI is on paper one of the absolute best sides of the world. But they also looks the least organized. You can't have it all. If you want to defend deep and to be this counter attacking side, when Declan Rice is not your number 6. You need someone better under pressure and play those incisive passes. But if you want to be that agressive high pressing side, Harry Kane is not your center forward. You need to dominate possession and supply him with a lof ot chances. For example, France is playing Rabiot in the miedfield despite him not having his best season with Juventus and also N Golo Kanté who went to Saudi Arabia while Tchouaméni and Camavinga are most of the times left on the bench. It's unthinkable for England team to do this kind of things. England can still step up in important matches and show higher level when it matters so we should not write them off yet.

Why Germany Have Been The Best Team At EURO 2024 (So Far)

At first view, Germany committing sometimes 6 players in attack should be a catastrophic system with Kross playing alongside the centerbacks and Andrick playing as the pivot. For Germany it's working and it's not uncomon to see cdm dropping back alongside the centerbacks like Kross is doing. The main difference is that Kross is not playing centrally but he is rather dropping narrow on the left. It's preventing teams that want to press you to really press you. If Kross manage to open up that space in front of him not only he has the whole pitch in front of him but it's also less risky because if he gives the ball away it's not as bad as if he was central. Scotland was not the team that wanted to press a lot in these half spaces Kross was in. What's important is what happene ahead of him when he is in these spaces with the ball. Germany used their fullbacks as the main width providers and 4 main attackers, Wirtz, Gundogan, Musialia and Havertz. Musiala had the freedom to go whenever he wanted while Wirtz did a lot of works in this right handspace where he wanted to be. He is also free to come in the left handside During the second goal against Hungrary, the left back is making his run, dragging one of the defenders while the others don't know if they should stay or go. You had also that situation against Scotland where Kai Havertz dropped deep so he could receive from Kross, dragging a defender and opening spaces. Musiala makes his run and Kross spots this. Then even if Musialia doesn't receive any ball, the space created by his run saw German players going in that space Scotland had not the time to reorganize or resert themselves. Players make individual decisions between moving or staying, making it more difficult. Germany has a lot of talentet players who can move wide, move more centrally,make a lot of things with their movements but what makes it so good is that it's a relativly simple concept. It looks at first difficult with Musialia and Wirtz shifting more inside, to have only Andrich holding this whole thing together in the center. While England, Portugal and France seem to struggle to find a system, Germany just like Spain seem to know what they are and will doing. Also we could wonder before the tournament if Havertz would be play as a false striker position or with Fullkrug who love to be a pure striker. In fact, Havertz is doing everything and we are seeing this with his heat map since he is dropping off often , out wide, or being in the 10 role, creating for his teamates in small spaces while also b eing in the box as a stricker.

How Spain Are Suffocating Their Opponents

Spain was able to exploit a weakness in Italy's defensive structure.Both teams started on paper in 4 3 3. However in reality, Spain had possession in the vast majority of the match. One of the reasons Spain can control the tempo and the possession that well during the build up is the position of their fullbacks. They are both used very deep and very wide. Basically a back 4 but they can circulate the ball and make it very difficult for the opposition to close down the players who have the ball. Italy looked to press men to men in the first phase of build up. Scamacca was in 2 v 1 against the centerbacks. So they could push Frateesi higher. Then you have Jorginho or Barella trying to pick up Rodri in the center while Chiesa and Pellegrino would push to cover out wide. So if Barella pressed Rodri, Jorginho could be in 1 v 2 against Ruiz and Pedri. Italy had Calafiori pushing up in the miedfield even if he is a centerback. It left the backline in a 3 v 3 against Williams, Morata and Yamal. So Spain would instead try to exploit the spaces between the lines. Morata could that well as he was occupying positions between the lines. Since these positions, Spain could move out wide with the wingers being very good in 1 v 1 situations especially Nico Williams against Di Lorenzo. Then Italy adopted a more passive 4 1 4 1 in defense. But the issue was still Spain's fullbacks when thye had possession further up the pitch. Cucurella and Carvajal were hugging the touchline and Italy wanted to close them down. They did this with Chiesa and Pellegrino moving outwide.The issue is that it left gaps into the half spaces that Spain was able to exploit. These spaces were dangerous against Croatia as well. But against Croatia, Spain did it in a diferent way. Ruiez would often be in that half spaces on Cucurella's side and then switch to the opposite flank. Spain was confident with playing diagonical passes to the wingers. While Yamal was the major danger in the first match, in the second against Italy, Nico Williams was more dangerous. In this match however they weren't relying a lot on switching plays consistently. They were playing more on the side of the ballon. Pedri was comfortable moving in the other side where the ball was to create overloads alongside guys like Morata, Rodri, Cucurella, Williams, Ruiz and Laporte. Chiesa and pellegrini's positions were an issue because it left the fullbacks isolated for a 1 v 1. In the left also we saw a lot of combinations between Williams and Cucurella with Cucurella often attacking these half spaces in the left. A lot of rotations were happening outwide with Fabian Ruiz as well. Add Rodri, Morata and Pedri to this and it's no wonder why Spain managed to control the tempo of the game. When the fullbacks were closed down, the ball was moving to the wingers either directly, either indirectly from outwide to central player who whould then move it against out wide to the winger, creating a 1 v 1 situation. As soon as Williams was on Di Lorenzo, Morata would push on Bastoni so Bastoni couldn't add more help. Chiesa would not track back effectivly. When Italy does their build up, Spain moved a lot of players on the side where the ball is with the defenders being comfortable pushing forward. Spain left a lot of spaces in the opposite flank but Italy didn't find these spaces. Off the ball, Spain kept an agressive pressing staying essentially in his 4 3 3 structure. Williams and Yamal were very agressive on their back 3 when they tried to build. The middle was controlled by Spain so Italy wanted to switch on 3 2 5 with a lot of runs in these positions into the half spaces. Italy already won euro with Spinazolla on the left flank so it's not a surprise they are dangerous here with Di Marco this time. But 3 2 5 didn't work that much and even if they made some changes they weren't able to create any real dangerous opportunities.

&t=45s How One Manager Finally BROKE Alonso's Tactics

In the first 15 minutes, Atalanta barely had the ball. Yet they were in control of the game. The 3 center backs had a men advantage meaning that they had a free man, normally a wide center back who could move up the pitch But this match was different. Rather than being passive with his defenders forming a back 5, Gasperini was agressive with his front 3 going man to man. Grimaldo on the left usually looked to push high to attack but the pressure on the center backs was so hard he had to move deeper to be an option. But Atalanta kept suffocating Leverkusen with their wingbacks, Tappacosta and Ruggeri pressing Leverkusen's wingbacks, But one crafty turn by Xhaka or Palacios and they would ahve an immediate numerical advantage. But that moment never came. Atalanta's pressing was perfect. Even if the central miedfielders were receiving the ball, there was no chance of receiving it while facing Atalanta's goal. It would often force them backward. So Leverkusen's pivots had to take more risks, either take a risky turn, or aim to win the ball quickly. But Atalanta's pivots were ready to intercept any passes, allowing to win the ball back and attacking Leverkusen's center backs. With the miedfield cut off and the pressure mouting, Alonso searched for a solution. After the match, Alonso stated that they should have play more long balls. The thing is Leverkusen played long more often, at least wwhen it comes down to the 3 centerbacks. The difference is that it was Atalanta forciing them to do so rather than Leverkusen choosing it. Hincape, Tah and Tapsoba had more long balls playing than average during this season. When Ederson and Koopmeiners went against Leverkusen's pivots, the front 3 threated to make runs in behind Now Frimpong could hold the width and Wirtz drop deeper. Stanisic looked to invert agressivly. But Atalanta's secret was the trust Gasperini had in his players. This meant that the centerbacks had the freedome to go high in their man to man orientation. Hien, the right wide centerback of Atalanta, was hoding own against Adli Djimsiti would follow Wirtz to shut hum down and the man to man orientation meant that the back 3 would be as loopsided as they were running away from the front 3. It resulted in some gaps being open in central regions. Adli wsa supposed to be the man going in but Stanisic also stepped up on rare occasions here. Frimpong on the other side was perfectly positionned because not only he was isolating the wide centerback Kolasinac but the others forwards created room in the defense. Paired with the vertical spaces created by Atalanta backline meant that he was perfectly positionned to make the run in behind. In possession, Atalanta's wingbacks were more agressive, Zappacosta particularly pushing high. De Ketelare and Lookman could then tigh their shape around Xhaka. When Lookman dropped deep, dragging a centerback, it opened up spaces When being high on the pitch, Atalanta's main focus was trying as many shoots as possible. It was helped by the ball moving wide quickly supported by the attacking wingbacks, which allowed the front 3 to focus on attacking the box high up, rather than making connexions deep. Boniface came on for Leverkusen with Frimpong moving to the wingback position but only on paper, since he still stayed very high. It had the advantage of keeping the front 3 at close proximity, opening up the potential for combinations. The reason why Alonso didn't start with that is Tapsoba would be isolated on the transitions as the right centerback. Bonifca allowed Leverkusen offensive players to push forward as he was not only a target man but also able to link between the miedfield and the attack while holding off Hien, Atalanta's central centerback.

Tactical Analysis : Real Madrid 1-1 Man City | How Ancelotti Shut Down The City Build Up|

Real Madrid knew that if they played in their default defensive shape, there was the risk of City having the numerical advantage in the miedfield as City likes to use the miedfield box. So Real Madrid had to be more agressive than usual in the press to prevent this situation from occuring in first place. Madrid pressed high to prevent City from building up easily. Stones started deep then would be pushing up to be the second pivot alongside Rodri. But with the high press we often saw Gundogan having to drop deep instead to be the other pivot. Valverde and Modric were looking to press City's double pivot. This meant that Kross could be free to follow De Bruyne. Benzema was ready to apply pressure on Stones while Rodrygo was closer to Dias. At times this meant City would have to go longer. But City still tried to find advantages into the miedfield with De Bruyne pushing on the same half space than Gundogan meaning that with Kross following him, there was a potential for Haaland to drop a bit deeper to be found between the lines. But De Bruyne could tuck in to receive the ball in deeper regions. Sometimes City was still able to make their box miedfield box after passing the first wave of pressure. With Benzema being on Dias, it meant that the wide centerback, Walker and Akanji were often the outlet options. If Akanji had the ball, Rodrygo would look to press while while Vinicius would look to do the same in Walker's case. Even if the wingers dropped deeper to receive, Real Madrid's fullbacks were very agressive on them. Into the miedfield, Man City looked for isolation situations, with Bernardo Silva against Camavinga. Althought Camavinga often forced Silva to make a back pass, it sometimes created opportunities for guys like De Brune to make runs between the fullbacks and the centerbacks. De Bruyne got a good shooting opportunity this way. But Real Madrid's players adapted to this by having Valverde often dropping into the right half space It would temporarly form a back 5. So the miedfield was still 2 v 2 as the wide centerbacks could focus on their man. And these half spaces runs would be more easy to track by Real Madrid. If Valverde was in the miedfield, Real Madrid was sitting deep and narrow. When the ball was played to their wingers, Carvajal and Camavinga closed their man down while the rest of the back shift across here. Camavinga was often targetting, with balls being played to Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne making underlapping runs to potentially receive and cross. However, Vinicius often was slow to track back after Real Madrid was attacking So Guardiola was willing to take the risk to have Walker overlap down the right handside at times to make it 2 v 1 against Camavinga. However with Stones pushing in the miedfield, it would leave City vulnerable during the defensive phases. If Vinicius got the ball, he had Benzema to support him with only Akanji and Dias to stop them for a few seconds. When defending, Man City was playing in 4 4 2 with De Bruyne joining Haaland in front and the rest of the miedfield shifting across. From goalkick, Rudiger and Alaba would provide the passing outlets to Courtois with Haaland and De Bruyen looking to cose them down. So they could play it to their fullbacks which would draw City's wingers. But then, Real Madrid would be the one having numerical advantage in the miedfield with Kross often being the option as the pivot. Later in the game, in defensive phases, Man City would look for piston press with one man pressing at time and the other looking to cover Toni Kross. Sometimes we saw Toni Kross joining the backline meaning that they had a 3 v 2 advantage while the miedfield had their 2 v 2 situation. Madrid also looked to overload often the left handside with Modric and Camavinga switching positions, Vinicius and Benzema often dropping into these regions. That meant that Carvajal and Rodrygo both could occupy the wide regions in the right and be options for quick long switches with both of them often interchanging positions. Eventually, both sides were tactically matched and it took individual brillance from players to make the difference.

Tactical Analysis : Brazil 4-1 South Korea| A Different Level From Brazil |

South Korea were looking to press in a 4 4 2 whatever Brazil was building from the goalick or even in more open plays situations. Because the 2 forwards pressed the centerbacks, the center miedfielders had to back up the press in order to make it more difficult for Brazil to find their miedfielders. But obvious problem was that they were 3 v 2 down and their extra men was Neymar. Because of the threat of pacy wingers like Vinicius and Raphina, it was difficult for the backline to back up the press. So they tended to sit slightly deeper. This would open spaces for Neymar between the lines. So Neymar is free because South Korea's doubles pivots are more concerned with Brazil's pivots than him. But Danilo during build up liked to operate more centrally alongside Casemiro, like an inverted fullback. This would give the freedom for Paqueto to push forward with Neymar often in the lft handside. With Danilo moving central, the wingers were dragged centrally with him also. The fullback had a problem since if he stayed high on Vinicius, Neymar would be free but if he stayed too narrow, Vinicius could receive the ball and then have a run on the fullback even when he came out. So the defense drifted aisde on the left. So Richarlison also drifted aside. Because of this overload it would be dificult for the backline to shift across. There were massive gaps between the defense and the miedfield and Neymar was dropping into these. Once he is drawing a fullback, Brazil had plenty of players in advanced positions. (modifié) Some teams used to deal with this kind of situations with the team not pressing high and instead having their forwards to cover the double pivots, allowing their own pivots to operate in deeper regions, which would allow them to cover more Neymar's movements while Lee could stay deeper to help the fullback in 1 v 2 situations. Higher up, Korea defended in a narrower 4 4 2 with their wingers often tucking in. But it had problems with the ability of Vinicius and Raphina in 1 v 1 situations. When Brazil was playing out wide, the winger could either take his men directly, either look to combine with the men in the half spaces, often being Neymar or Paqueta. For the first goal for example, Vinicius had the time and space to finish it because of Brazil's front 5. Brazil defended in a 4 4 2 mid block at times especially after scoring so early. Korea's fullbacks were quite agressive with Lee tucking in to be the third men, allowing his fullback to overlap. While Swang would hug the touchline, J. Kim could either tuck into the miedfield either also look to overlap wirings at times. So it left large gaps between the defense. When the ball was high, both Neymar and RIcharlisson tended to stay quite up so in the transitions, Brazil could either find their wingers running in behind, either find their forwards for a 1 v 1. Either way it wsa not ideal for South Korea so Brazil was enjoying playing in counter attacking football style. Even when Koreas's fullbacks were ditting deeper, Brazil kept staying agressive with their wingers pushing high on them. And they had the quality advantage in almost every positions to thrive in 1 v 1 situations.

Tactical Analysis Champions League Final|Liverpool 2-0 Tottenham|Goals:Salah, Origi| How to Press Liverpool lined up in their classic 4 3 3 with Matic and Van Dijk as center backs with Robertson and Alexander Arnold as respectively left back and right back. Fabinho was in the holding miedfielder role with Hederson and Wijnaldum alongside him either side. Finally, Salah, Mané and Firminho was in the attack. Tottenham lined up with a 4 2 3 1 with Alderweireild and Vertonghen as both center backs with Rose and Trippier either side. Sissoko and WInks were the double pivots. Finally, behind Harry Kane who was the forward, Ali, Eriksson and Son. Liverpool scoring early affected the way they played. They decided to hold their shape and to play convervatively. Building from deep Liverpool usually used a single pivot in conjunction with the center backs. However in the final third they choosed to play with a double pivot of Fabinho and Henderson. Wijnaldum would in the same time give the depth by pushing highe rup. The double pivot mean that Tottenham needed to commit more players in the press. Spurs wanted to defend in a 4 2 3 1. By by pressing high, Spurs would often use their entire front 4. However Alisson being good on the ball meant that even with Kane pressing, he would pass the ball into the center back or a miedfielder which would often allow Liverpool to progress the ball forward into thegap left in the pressing rooms. After progressing the ball into the miedfield line up, since Spurs had to keep a relativly high line since they were chasing the score, Liverpool knew they could use the pace of Salah and Mané over the top to free up the space which was a comon tactic was for Firminho to drop deep into the miedfield. If a center back followed him then spaces would be open for Salah or Mané or even occasionally, Henderson. But if the center backs stayed deep, both Salah and Mané would drift wider and with Firminho occupying a miedfield, it would give spaces to others Liverpool's miedfielders to try and find the pass over the top. Mané would try to run behind Trippier and Slaha behind Rose. This tactic becameeven more pronounced with Origi coming in when Spurs had to become even more offensive. Liverpool could try long balls to the forward. But another tactic used was the left handside overload. Spurs initially wanted to play the ball from the back as much as possible. Vertonghen and Abderweireld. Winks could drop to receive the ball off them. But when Liverpool presssed high as well, Sissoko would drop to try and receive the ball. But it was a trap set by Liverpool as Henderson would wait him to have the ball before pressing him immediatly as he was the less technically gifted miedfielder. This forced Tottenham to play long with Matic and Van Dijk dominating in the air.. But Pochettino adapted to this in second half as he kept Trippier and Rose both very high. So if the ball was in one side of the pitch, the opposition's fullback would be free as MAné was ensure to either press the center back, either press Trippier. Spurs could then switch the ball quickly to progress the ball forward. But Liverpool's press was sometimes very effective as they waited the center back to receive the ball centrally before closing them down from the sides to cut off the wide passes. So Pochetinno kept his front 4 high between the lines of Liverpool's high pressing miedfield and the defense. It meant Liverpool's fullbacks had to defend extremely narrow and Rose and Trippier could push even higher to be found with quick passes or a switch. In second half, Tottenham also foud some ways centrally with longb alls being played for Kane with Ali trying to get behind Alexander Arnold. But at the same tme, Eriksson and Son would be ready for any second ball. But if Spurs needed groud passes, they changed their approaches, using more first time passes because as the Liverpool's miedfield would come into the press, they will be able to play around it. Since Spurs kept mens between the lines, they would be able to use combinations plays. However Matic and Van Dijk kept their distances close, meaning that Spurs couldn't penetrate and instead would play in front of the defense. They barely made 2 long shoots, all sotpped by Alisson. Liverpool always had numbers in the box, allowing them to not concede from crosses thanks to their narrow defense.

Tactical Analysis|Liverpool 4-0 Barcelona| Goals (Wijnaldum, Origi)|3rd Man Runs| Liverpool Comeback The high press isolating Messi and Suarez high up the pitch was a major factor. Valverde attempted to use a similar tactic to the first leg by bringing on semedo but Liverpool overwhelmed them with the 3rd man runs. Busquets not dropping in line with the centrebacks aided Liverpool's press which was a strange choice by Valverde. As for lines up, Origi and Shaquiri tool the places of Salah and Firminho who were both injured. Miefield had Henderson, Milner and Fabinho. Defense had VDD, Matic, TAA and Robertson. Roberto, Alba, Piqué and Langlet were the defenders for Barcelona. Vidal, Busquets and Rakkitic for the miedfield The front 3 was composed of Messi, Coutinho and Suarez. During build up for Liverpool, both fullbacks would push high ahead of center backs with Fabinho dropping to receive the ball off them. Miler and Henderson positionned themselves slightly higher on the pitch. Here Barcelona defended in their usual 4 4 2. Henderson and Miler woudl force Busquets and Rakitic to stay deeper on the pitch. This would leave the front 3 isolated, not being able to press effectively against 3 mens as Coutinho and Vidal were picking the wide players. Liverpool's front 3 stayed infield meaning that Barcelona's fullbacks would tuck in to defend against them, which would often leave spaces for Robertson or Trent for a direct switch and then a cross was attempted. If they couldn't make a direct switch, they would either side overload and then switch. Milner would often pick up the left handside channel alongside one of the forwards and fullback, which would draw Barcelona across before a quick switch. Another factor in Liverpool's efficiency was the miedfield runners. The central meidfielders were granted freedom by Klopp to break forward during play, especially in the attacking transitions. As the forwards tucked in and the miedfielders came forward, it gave them the central overloads in several situations. This meant that cross were good options for Liverpool. Their major ploys of wide play and switching combined with the miedfield runners led to most of their goals. In the first goal Henderson ran forward in the anticipation of a ball from Mané. He breaks into the box, has a shoot but Origi finishes it off. For the second goal, Trent cross from out wide. Wijnaldum runs from the miedfield for the goal. For the third goal, Mané occupied a Barcelona'ss defender, allowing Shaqiri to cross and again, the miedfielder's run is not picked up, allowing him to score. In the first leg, Busquets would drop between the centerbacks during Barcelona's build ups. It meant that for an effective press, Liverpool had to commit more mens, leaving spaces in behind them. But here in the second leg, Barcelone build up with a double pivot and back 3 behind them, with the fullbacks providing the width and passing options. Busquets is ahead of the miedfield so Liverpool can press the centerbacks and the goalkepper, forcing them long. Barcelona atttemped 67 long balls in the match, which was more than Liverpool, who attemped 54 long balls. The passes would then be mopped up by Liverpool's centerbacks. In addition, Liverpool's press would often isolate the forwards from the miedfield. On several occasions, Messi pick up the ball and Suarez makes a run. Fabinho is able to track back and make the tackle, while the centerbacks could handle Suarez's runs. In the first half however, Barceloan found sucess in the left handside as Trent went high and the front 3 didn't track back. Coutinho and Alba found spaces in the left hand channel they were able to generate a couple of chances from this region. 1. But at the end of the day, Klopp's use of ht ewide plays combined with the miedfield's runners was enough to get him and Liverpool to the UCL final and eventually the final fin in that final.

Brazil 2-0 Argentina | Tactical Analysis |How To Stop Messi|Copa America 2019|(Goals:Firmino, Jesus)

On paper Brazil lined up in a 4 2 3 1 with a back 4 made of Marquinhos, Silva as cb, Sandro and Alves as fullbacks. Arthur, Casemiro and Coutinho were in the miedfield. Coutinho and Jesus provided the width and Firminho was forward. On paper Argentina lined up with a 4 3 3 with Foyth and Tagliafico as fullbacks. With Otamendi and Pezzela as center backs. Acuna and De Paul made the miedfield with Martinez, Aguero and Messi on top. Often one of Brazil's fullback would tuck in with the other giving the vertical depth by advancing high on the pitch. It would draw Argentinas forwards who would often use their whole front 3 during the press. If the route to the fullbacks were cut off, the double pivots, Artur and Casemiro, had to give passing options more centrally. Argentina's problem with collective press was that Firminho was great at creating vertical depth which would draw Argentina's center backs deep. It often created spaces for the likes of Coutinho between the lines. So Argentina in 2 diferent ways who themselves caused problems. If they pressed high up, they left a gap between the defense and the miedfield and Coutinho will be feed up between the lines. But if the miedfield dropped deep, Coutinho would drop deeper as well. It would give him time from these positions to look for an incisive pass. Argentina's forwards would often be slow to track back during fast build up. And with Alves and Sandro being highly attacking fullbacks, it would create 2 v 1 or 1 v 1 on the flanks. Argentina tried to correct this by dropping into a 4 4 2. But this would leave them light in the center. So they often choose to guard the center while leaving up the flanks. To sustian pressure, ifi they had the time to do so, Argentina would often drop into a 4 1 4 1. But even when the ball was on the far side, Brazil looked to keep at least on man wide to stretch the opponent. The width Brazil maintained drawed both center backs out of position. It left Jesus with a free shoot into the box. At the same time, Brazil was controlling the match and never over committed. This was achieved by the center backs and defensive miedfielers in positiosn when they were on the ball. As for Argentina, Tagliafico was comfortable with both defensive and attacking parts. But Foyth is usually center back. So his attacking range was limited. This meant that their attacks had to go thought the center a lot of times exclusively. The ball often went to Paredes. But Argentina's build up looked like often a 2 3 3 2. Brazil alternated between a high press and a deep 4 2 3 1. Because of the lack of width, Argentina would often rely on Messi to drop deep and build up. Scaloni often had Acuna or De Paul dropping into the half spaces in order to draw the attention away from the center to give Messi and Paredes more spaces. But Brazil's double pivots dealt with this as well. They always kept Messi in front of the shield, never allowing him between the lines. If Messi dropped deep, Brazil pushed high and if Messi pushed higher, the team dropped deeper. To get Messi away from the goal, Brazil kept him ahead of both Casemiro and Arthur. Also when Messi dropped deep, the forwards didn't provide a descent passing option for an easy forward pass. When Di Maria came on the left, things kinda improved with him providing the width on the left. As Argentina committed more players forward, Brazil remained dangerous on the break, keeping players high in order for counter attacks. This eventually led to the second Brazil's goal.

&t=430s Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-0 Croatia | Messi Magic Gets it done |

Despite having less the ball than Croatia, Argentina had a clear plan whatever in deep side of the pitch as well as high up. Initially out of possession, Croatia could defend with a single forward even if Modric from miedfield could push higher up alongside Rovariv. However one oh his role was stopping the progressive miedfield from Argentina. So when Fernandez or Paredes drop deep at times, Modric would be the man tasked with pressing high on the man in order to make it more difficult for Argentina to get ball from deeper to higher. Only difference was that against Brazil when he was picking up Casemiro, only Danilo was left to progress the ball. And Danilo is not that good at progression. With with Paredes and Fernandez Argentina had 2 excellent ball progressers, making it difficult for Modric to stop the play. When Modric was pressing a man, both Fernandez and Paredes were comfortable with dropping deeper to form a back 3 and drawing Modric higher on the pitch. With Argentina would still have a 3 v 2 advantage with the halp of the 2 center backs against Modric and Kramaric. It woud allow not only Molina and Tagliafico to push higher on the pitch, but also as a result, both miedfielders De Paul and Mc Allistair would tuck in. With Modric dragged higher up there was a potential 2 v 3 down in favor or Argentina with Kovacic and Krozovic as central miedfielders against Paredes, De Paul and McAllistair. When Paredes dropped betwee, the center backs, Fernandez would take his place. So Croatia started to defend in a more conversative way with Modric dropping back along the miedfielders. But with Modric applying less pressure on him, Fernandez would push into the miedfield with Otamendi and Romero taking care of the progression against Kramaric. Croatia was aware about Argentina often attacking with 5 mens in previous matches so to avoid being outnumbered, we could see Pasalic dropping deeper to make a men to men situation, which mean that even if Argentina overloaded one side of the pitch and forced the defense shifting across, there would never be the free man on the far side. It was coupled by Croatia moving narrow with Perisic tucking in. So the center was well protected. So rather than McAllistair and Messi pushing too high, both operated as more traditionnal miedfielders for most part of the match. That meant that with a man advantage into the miedfield, space could be found spaces especially with Alavrez being a threat in front with his pace and runs, to push the back line deeper. Messi ended up with the most passes and dribbles in this match. At times when Messi was in these half spaces zones, Gvardiola was agressive on him This could leave spaces where runners like Molina or Alvarez could take advantage of. However it's worth noting that all 3 Argentina's goals were not really coming from Argentina's tactical masterclass but rather from pure quality and brillance of players like Alvarez and Messi. Messi wasn't pressing a lot fo Croatia could get out from the goalkick pretty easily. Even in deeper zones, Argentina maintained their 4 4 2 shape. Brozovic could drop between the center backs if needed. But for the most part, Brozovic dropping deep wasn't needed as a back 2 was enough. Croatia looked to push their fullbacks very high to allow their wingers to tuck in; We saw it especially against Brazil. To create a 5 v 5, Mc Allistair could drop for a few times into the back line. With Kovacic, Modric and Brozovic, Croatia had 3 outstanding deep miedfielders, allowing them to keep possession at 60% during the match. All 3 tended to move into one side of the pitch to take advantages of the wide regions. We often saw it on the left handside of the pitch, allowing Susa to push high and Perisic to move infield. But Croatia's problem is that their miedfield was not that good at creating chances. They were good instead at progressing the ball and keeping possession. Keeping the 3 miedfielders deep was a tactical chooice by Dalic so at times it was difficult to find a player between the lines. At times when Perisic came in front, it would Kramaric who would drop in. But he is not an attacking miedfielder. This was made worse by the fact that their shape meant that the fullbacks were the ones in 1 v 1 situations. And neither of them were particulary good at passing their man the ball at their feet. And the rare moments they did a cross, Kramaric being the progressive player at times made it difficult. Add that with tha aerial dominance of Otamendi and Romero. Sosa was replaced by Orsic who would start wide then tuck in with Petkovic replacing Kramaric looking to pin back the center backs. Perisic would be the one at left back position and now he would be in 1 v 1 situations, where he was better at than Sosa. However it iwas too late and not enough.

Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|

Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the miedfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper. However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the miedfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.

How Pep Won The League With His Weakest Tactics | Man City 2023/24 Tactical Analysis After winning the treble,

The expectations were not that high for Man City now especially after the departure of Gundogan Outside him, Laporte, Cancelo, Mahjrez and Palmer were all leaving. It was made worse by the fact that John Stones spent most of the early part of the season unavailable. When De Bruyne went out with an injury during the first match of ths season, it was about to be a difficult season. At the beginning Guardiola still was prepared for the challenge and instead of John Stones, It was Akanji who would push from the defense to the miedfield during the build up. But Akanji was more traditionnal centerback than Stones, raising some worries about how he would copte. If the Citys back 3 was pressed, Rodri would look to free himself to take the ball as much as possible as he could. He would often then look for the bounce pass to Akanji who would now receive the ball while facing the rest of the play. He was actually great. But Akanji still struggled more to turn back to the opposite goal when he got the ball compared to Stones which often led to a safe pass back to the center back. Even if City could deal with that, the miss of Rodri during the 2 games he was suspended against Arsenal and the Wolves during which City lost showed how important he was to the side. Pep tried to deal with that with replacing them by players like Kovacic and Bernardo Silva as a double pivot. Or play Rico Lexis from right back and invert Despite having great retainers of possession, they lacked penetrative passes that Rodri often made when he was here or the penetration Rodri is making ball to feet. But even when Rodri was in the starting XI, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. More often the opposition looked to protect the center at all costs. It would make it harder the City's miedfielders to create danger on top. Opposite's wingers would operate narrow as well. Often you would see the opposition defend in narrow 4 4 2 with the front 2 not being bait into the press. Add that to the 2 central miedfielders and you had a box defending shape to counter the box miedfield City was using. Bernardo Silva would look to drop outside the narrow block to receive the ball The downside would be that there is one less attacking player upfront. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez often got played as a 10 rather than a center forward. Alvarez had to be trusted at making the creative burden, something he couldn't do especially against such narrow defenses. Despite being a press skilled resistant miedfielder it happened that Kovacic was put higher on the pitch more as a 10 than as a 6. The lack of plays into the center meant there were less services into Haaland. And to make things worse, Haaland had a less effective season in front of the goal considering the expected goals he missed and the expected goals he scored compared to the last season. Guardiola made the 2 wide center backs playing extremly wide, almost as traditionnal fullbacks. It was made to draw a presser out of the center block to create more passing lanes in the center. Despite having 2 v 1 in these wide regions, the central center back would be isolated. Also the wide center backs were unlickely to advance high. But having the opposition playing this narrow, it left more possibilities for the winger having 1 v 1 situations. However when City's wingers dropped deeper to receive the ball, the opposition could be very agressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball. So Guardiola needed some individual brillances to make the difference and it came from Doku while Grealish is more a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man. Doku represented so many threats that the teams would often send their fullback mark him earlier or double team against him. But this would create room for the higher miedfielder to get the ball to create. However Doku who was a solution, could also be a problem. Grealish tend to retain possession while Doku loose it more often. And with the wide center backs so wide, opposition would be ready to hit on the transitions if the ball was lost. Aside from Walker, the back 3 was not very quick. However Pep could look to be ultra agressive with Ederson being an extra center back, shifting the backline to a back 4. Advantage of this is that no matter if opposition was pressing gk and defenders or not, there was a free man to look for. If the opposition stayed narrow and defensive, the defenders would be free. It was a solution althought not an idea one since it was made by the wide center backs who were not as progressive as the miedfielers. Also even Ederson would not be too adventurous to force a man out of the press as if he lost the ball, City would wuickly concede without a goalkepper. That's why Man City had to rely on De Bruyne more than usual. However in De Bruyne's absence, Foden was more than happy to take his place. He was one of the most creative players of the season in his dribbling, passing and even shooting. However as limited creativity in the center and half spaces and Haaland as being the lone goalscorer, Pep needed Foden to start centrally as much as possible. Pep used often to invert his fullbacks. But as the season progressed he used them more and more traditionally, allowing one of them to operate wide to provide the width and on rare occasions both mens pushing high. Seeing Gvardiol and Walker in these positions became more and more comon. It allowed the likes of Foden to be more times infield positions and to create centrally. He was able to pass the opposition defensive miedfield line to create a potential for a shoot in the goal or assist. No wonder he won the Premiere League player of the season award. This added the benefits of freeing up Silva or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones. It would make the progression less difficult as well as going into the creative zones. Man City still looked very bulverable on the counter attacks. Having Walker playing high doesn't help as even a player as fast as him can't gain so many ground to catch up if the advance between him and the opponent attacking his goal is too much. Also Walker took a step back defensivly Also having Akanji higher meant that a lot were asked to the center backs. So City conceded more than double the amount of goals on counter attacks than conceded during the 2022 2023 season. Despite this City was third before De Bruyne returned so they needed to make an exceptionnal finish. Then De Bruyne made his return, boosting not only his own stats and City's ones but also Haaland's ones. Despite De Bruyne moving out wide more often, him and De Bruyne still showed that they had a great understanding of each other. Also De Bruyne and Foden often made switches, drawing opponents and creating spaces for each other. Then at the end of the season, Bernardo Silva played more wide to facilitate De Bruyne and Foden playing centrally.

La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…

Back thenin 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right miedfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central miedfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the miedfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit. Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide miedfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player. They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whetever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack. When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming miedfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide miedfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide miedfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was ba lanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.

How Thiago Motta’s Tactic is Shaking up Serie A!

Thiago Motta used a system that see center backs being used as miedfielders and fullbacks as center backs while the keeper is the first attacker and the striker the first defender. His tactics are a fusion between 5 top managers philosophies, espacially Mourinho's counter attacks and Low's counterpressing. Motta was a player who played as a holding miedfielder. Playing with diferent top clubs across Europe he met diferent styles of play. This influced his coaching carrer and tactics. He took inspiration for build up from Cruyff. Attack like Gasperini's Atalanta. Counter attack like Mourinho's Inter and counterpress like Low's Germany. Motta started his manager's carrer with 2 failures but after this he realized that applying multiple philosophies is not enough if his teams cannot maintain basic possession. The ball became his primarly focus when joining Bologna. He said his players to use the ball as their close friends and they should keep it as long as possible. He started to succeed even beating top teams like Juventus while maintaining possession. His tactics gained significant attention. His keeper is one of the players in the middle of the pitch. He sees football in a upsdei down perspective. Rather starting his formation horizontally he vizualizes it vertically where he imagines 2 players at the base, a miedfield including the goalkepper with 2 players remaining at the top. When turning arou,d it ressembles to a familiar 4 3 3. But this one is diferent than normal ones. Motta prefers to overload more players in the central zone. Just like roaming miedfielders, he gave his striker and center backs roaming roles where the striker acted a a miedfielder who drops time to time. Motta allows both central defenders to push forward alternativly or simultaneously. If both of them advances, then the fullbacks tucks inside to take their place with the goalkepper acting like an extra defender. This completly disorganized others opposition's shape. As both defenders are upfront, they need extra player to cover these 2 and if they bring markers other than thr forwards, it opens spaces for Bologna attackers to exploit thought long passes. So the opposition often send their striker or wingers to mark them. It allow Bologna to play from the back quite easily. If opposition take a risk and play with 3 5 2 it would create a 5 men shield in front of the back line. So they employ a pass and push strategy to counter this. When a center back has the ball he quickly pass it to the other center back who drift forward taking a marker with him. It creates a passing line at the back where the keeper takes the position. With the pivot dropping back, it creates a 6 v 5 numerical advantage. Even if the opposition presses their backline, the advancing center back becomes a passing option which indirectly put the opposition in dilemma. It eventually helps them progressing the ball with ease. Unlike normal teams who employs vertical couter attacks from back to front, Motta uses a 2 7 2 shape to execute counter attacks. They shift on one side of the flank to drag the opposition toward that side as well. While the player on the opposite side stay wide just like a forward stays higher. As soon as they win the ball back, with no fear of offsides, they can play a quick diagonal pass toward him. This maneuver makes him a free man with enough spaces and time to cut inside and create a scoring opportunity. Zirkzee, the striker is assigned to a flee flowing role that is more dynamic than a false 9. His movements are not limited to vertical runs as he also moves into spaces you would not expect a striker to move into. Doing this he becomes a plus one advantage during build ups. Bologna often positions themselves as a 3 2 4 1 formation during their second phase of build up. This helps them to create a box structure not only in the center but also on the left and the right. This allows them to outnumber their opponents with always a free pass. But if the opposition is strong and can afford to play with a back 3, they could easily cover the box with 1 more marker. This is where Motta's roaming striker becomes useful. He can moves into these boxes, creating an additionnal passing options to create numerical superiorities. It maintains Bologna's ability to maintain players and progress throught the spaces into the final third. In the final third, Motta follows a similar philosophy to Mourinho's, inviting the opposition into their own half and launcing a quick counter attack. One problem about Mourinho's style is that as soon as the counter starts, apart from the forwards and the number 10, noone can advance quickly, putting immense pressure on the forwards with more markers around them. So Motta hadded his own touch into this tactic with both center backs advancing forward, Motta allows his miedfielders to adop a more agressive positions where the center miedfielders joins the front 3 by occupying the half spaces while the number 6 becomes the number 8. It establishes numerical superiority in counter attacks. The greatestthing about this is that it indirectly leads them to counter press with numbers with one pivot advanced, which is quite uncomon for a counter attacking team. In the final third one of the center backs drop deeper to form a back 3. The advanced center back is acting as a barrier against any long balls aimed at them. It helps the others players to press fully the opposition and regian the ball. Defensively Motta focues on protecting the central areas. Even when defending the center backs often press up high and cover the opposition's number 8 while the cdm drop deeper to cover the opposition's striker. When the opposition attack, they look like a 3 2 4 1. But as soon as they shift wide, both center backs drifts back to form a compact back 5. It transitions into a 5 4 1 shape. It allows the fullbacks to rpess more agressivly while ensuring central dominance, making them a difficult side to break down. They are the third less conceding side in the entire Serie A being just beside Juventus and Inter MIlan. The reason why player roles make these tactics unique is that keeper firstly play as pivotal role while the fullbacks have more defensive role. Their main job is to stay narrow and take the positions of the center backs when they advance. Both center backs and the libero dynamically move up and down the field to confuse the markers. It allows miedfielders to adopt more advanced positions. Due to this all 3 of them are playmakers. The right miedfielder Luis Ferguson is given a more roaming role. Unlike a box to box miedfielder who moves up and down, Ferguson moves more horizontally and drops wide into fullback's position when they tuck inside or takes the winger position when they invert. On the wing, both of them areinverted wingers. For horizontal counter attacks they typically stay wide and quickly inverts as soon as there is an opportunity. Motta's team has strong emphasis on keeping the ball. So the strategy resolves about keeping control of the game with possession. To maintain the 2 7 2 system he plays with 2 wide players on each side of the pitch at least. In defense Motta prefers high line and close down his opposition to apply JOachim Low's counter pressing strategy. In the final third, they work into the box and run at defense